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The Potential Impact on Trade of a Monetary Union in 
Southern Africa 
Sharon Mbano 
UCT Graduate School of Business 
February 2019 
Abstract 
Southern Africa has been exploring regional integration in the context of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). This dissertation seeks to examine the potential bilateral 
trade volume within SADC, that can be generated as a result of a hypothetical SADC currency 
union and to analyse its importance for policy. It can serve as a basis for the promotion of 
regional integration as a means of increasing intraregional trade in the region, on the continent 
and, ultimately, international trade. Regional monetary unions are envisaged by the African 
Union (AU) as building blocks towards an eventual continent-wide monetary union. In this 
respect a gravity model was estimated with panel data using pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), random and fixed effect estimations covering the period 2000 to 2017. Because a SADC 
multilateral currency union does not exist yet, similar existing versions of monetary integration 
arrangements in the region were used in this study to draw inferences. The monetary integration 
arrangements in the region include the Common Monetary Area, a fixed exchange rate regime 
adopted by South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Eswatini, as well as Zimbabwe’s multicurrency 
regime that includes the South African Rand and the Botswana Pula.     
 
The results are largely in line with theoretical expectations except for the currency union 
dummy variable coefficient which was found to not be statistically significantly different from 
zero. This therefore means that in the case of SADC, a currency union might not have an effect 
on bilateral trade flows between member countries. One major limitation lies in the fact that 
my analysis relies on data based on currency union proxies since a SADC currency union does 
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not already exist. Thus, any extrapolation from my results to infer the impact of an actual 
currency union on trade might lead to less than robust conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
The issue of monetary integration as an economic policy tool has garnered new-found interest 
in Africa. Giving rise to the question, “Does monetary integration boost trade between trading 
partners?”. Within Africa, there have been several recent monetary integration initiatives, and 
achieving a continent wide monetary union by 2021 has been adopted as a formal objective by 
the African Union (AU) (Fourie & Santana-Gallego, 2009). This has been motivated in part by 
the experience of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which is widely perceived as having 
been both successful and beneficial to member countries. The EMU, also known as the 
Eurozone, is an economic and monetary union of 17 of the European Union (EU) member states 
that have adopted the Euro as their common currency and sole legal tender1.The European 
Union was motivated initially by political imperatives but due to increased globalization, 
stronger regional and global economic integration started to play a central role (Fendel & 
Maurer, 2015). Southern Africa has been exploring regional integration in the context of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), a 15-member country free trade 
agreement (FTA)2. Following the 2006 summit of SADC leaders, a proposal was forwarded for 
a multilateral monetary union that would include all the SADC countries represented in figure 
1 below. 
 
The process leading to a monetary union comprises of several stages including macroeconomic 
convergence, monetary integration and ultimately a common currency and a central bank 
(Jefferis, 2007). This is known as the linear approach to economic integration which involves 
moving from preferential trade agreements (PTA), followed by FTAs, customs unions, a single 
market and then lastly economic and monetary union (Fourie and Santana-Gallego, 2009). 
Traditional customs union theory as postulated by Viner (1950) distinguishes between two 
welfare effects that is, trade creation and trade diversion3. Trade creation increases welfare 
while in general trade diversion results in a loss of welfare. In the linear approach, a common 
                                                 
1
While the European Union (UN) is a political and economic union of 28-member states, the EMU an economic 
and monetary union is a subset of this grouping whose monetary policy is determined by the European Central 
Bank (ECB). 
2 As of August 2018, the Union of the Comoros was admitted as a full member of SADC. See 
http://www.sadc.int/member-states/comoros/. 
3 Trade creation is a result of a member country importing more from a country where the cost of production is 
lower and trade diversion results from a member country switching its imports from a country with a lower cost 
of production to a country with a higher cost of production. 
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currency is assumed as the final step towards the integration process, as is the case with the 
Eurozone. A currency union may also be a result of a fixed exchange rate regime (Mundell, 
2002). One such example is the long history of trade and monetary integration of the Southern 
African countries of South Africa, Eswatini, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia. All five countries 
are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with all countries benefiting 
from the elimination of tariffs when trading with each other. All the other four countries are 
highly integrated with the South African economy where South Africa accounts for 50% of 
exports and imports of these countries. SACU countries, with the exception of Botswana, are 
also members of the Common Monetary Area (CMA) which was established in 1986 between 
South Africa, Lesotho and Eswatini, with Namibia joining in 1992. Under this agreement, each 
country still retains the right to issue its own national currency, albeit the currency is pegged at 
1:1 to the Rand. Not only is the Rand legal tender in the member countries, but there is also 
free capital flow between member countries (Masson, 2006). Although the CMA cannot be 
fully classified as a monetary union due to the absence of a common central bank, the central 
banks of the smaller CMA member countries are heavily influenced by the South African 
Reserve Bank’s (SARB) monetary policy (Nchake et al, 2018). The last and most extreme 
version of a currency union that was considered in this dissertation is dollarization. That is, 
adopting a foreign currency as legal tender (Nitsch, 2002). An example of this type of exchange 
rate regime in Southern Africa is Zimbabwe and its implementation of a multicurrency regime 
including the US dollar, the Rand and the Pula. 
 
Advantages of monetary unions have been well documented, and these are both political and 
economic. These include the promotion of trade, efficiency gains, improved quality and 
credibility of macroeconomic policymaking that all ultimately result in economic growth. 
However, it may be appropriate to be cautious about rushing the process of monetary 
integration.  Drawing from the lessons of the EMUs experiences, which is still in its infancy, it 
is therefore too early to draw precise empirical assessments. While the Euro has been widely 
accepted by member countries, issues remain with regards to the adoption of a one size fits all 
monetary policy and the choice of appropriate fiscal policy rules. Because fiscal policies are 
determined at a national level, fiscal authorities may pursue macroeconomic policies that are 
contrary to those of the monetary authorities (Beetsman and Giuliodori, 2010). A monetary 
union in the African context would have to be implemented credibly and sequentially after 
considering the benefits of a monetary union. The outcomes of the analysis will be dependent 
on political, economic and the social cultural differences of the countries concerned and the 
 3 
 
degree of macroeconomic divergence among these countries. The African developmental 
context is very different from that of Europe and therefore it does not necessarily follow that 
what might work in Europe can easily be transferred or replicated in the African context. 
 
 
Figure 1. SADC member states 
 
 
Source: (The African Capacity Building Foundation, 2016) 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
The relevance of regional integration is a pertinent issue in Africa, specifically in view of a 
myriad of political and economic challenges that the continent faces. According to Alves, 
Draper and Khumalo (2009), the presence of entry barriers to the markets of developed 
countries, minimal share of world trade, and low pace of development in human capital and 
infrastructure act as deterrents for the realisation of the African regional integration agenda. 
Ensuring the success of regional economic integration in Africa is important, not only because 
of the challenges cited above, but also because of the policy implications for the process of 
globalization and the successful integration of Africa into the world economy. Owing to these 
facts, regional integration in Africa is a must, in the hopes that it will help enhance economic 
development and growth on the continent (Negasi, 2009). There are plenty of empirical studies 
regarding the effects of regional economic integration on trade flows. Various researchers 
employ different methods to analyse the effects of regional economic integration and the 
findings are mixed. Although early empirical studies used cross-sectional data to estimate 
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gravity models (Rose, Lockwood and Quah, 2000), most researchers nowadays use panel data4 
(Glick & Rose, 2001). One reason for the preferred use of panel data is that the extra time series 
observations result in more robust estimates. However, these studies predominantly focus their 
analysis on developed countries. This indicates a limitation with regards to policymakers 
making inferences about the impact of regional economic integration for developing countries 
in the African context. To the best of my knowledge, little work has been done to employ the 
panel data approach at African regional level. Despite several empirical contributions in recent 
years, the impact of regional economic integration on trade in the SADC region using the 
gravity model has not been investigated rigorously. This void motivates my study which 
focuses on SADC membership and its effects on trade using bilateral trade data from 2000 to 
2017. To assess the impact of a hypothetical SADC currency union on trade flows of member 
nations, this study relies on a gravity model and disaggregated data. An augmented gravity 
model of panel data approach is used to investigate whether a SADC currency union will result 
in an increase in intraregional trade between member countries. 
 
1.3 Statement of research objectives  
The main objective of this dissertation is to gain a better understanding of the impact on bilateral 
trade flows between SADC member countries as a result of a hypothetical regional currency 
union. Because a SADC multilateral currency union does not exist yet, similar existing versions 
of monetary integration arrangements were used to draw inferences5.  Furthermore, the 
dissertation also examines the following specific objectives in addition to the broader objective: 
• To analyse the impact on trade flows between the SADC member country trading pairs 
if they all adopt a common currency and relinquish their monetary policy to a common central 
bank. 
• To give recommendations to policymakers given the findings on the potential 
effectiveness and feasibility of a currency union in SADC. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Panel data is a combination of cross-sectional data and time-series data resulting in more observations. 
5 These monetary integration arrangements include the Common Monetary Area (CMA), which has its members 
Namibia, Lesotho and Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland, pegging their respective currencies to the South 
African Rand at the rate of 1:1 and the multicurrency regime adopted by Zimbabwe in 2009 which includes the 
use of the Rand and the Pula as legal tender in the country. 
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1.4 Research Hypothesis 
The null hypothesis for the study is: 
H0: No relationship exists between increase in trade activity of a SADC country trading pair as 
a result of sharing a common currency. 
Tested against the alternative hypothesis that: 
H1: A positive relationship does exist between increase in trade activity of a SADC country 
trading pair as a result of sharing a common currency. 
 
1.5 Purpose and Significance of Study 
In this dissertation I seek to quantify the impact on bilateral trade of a SADC currency union 
and to analyse its importance for policy. It can serve as a basis for the promotion of regional 
integration as a means of increasing intraregional trade in the region and on the continent and 
ultimately international trade. Furthermore, considering the number of regional monetary 
integration initiatives underway in Africa a study of the impact on trade of a currency union is 
important. The results can shed light on the desirability for individual countries to take part in 
such an initiative and the approach to be adopted, taking into account the benefits and the costs 
of such an undertaking. 
 
1.6 Organisation of Study 
The dissertation is organized as follows. The first chapter begins with the introduction giving 
the background of the study followed by the second chapter which covers the overview on the 
existing SADC regional economic communities. The third chapter investigates the existing 
trade theories and the literature review on empirical studies conducted on the subject matter. In 
chapter 4, I review the methodology to be used detailing sample selection, and the empirical 
analysis framework. Chapter 5 reports and discusses the results. The last chapter looks at the 
justifications of conducting the study and the usefulness of the research. 
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CHAPTER 2. SUMMARY ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide a detailed background on the regional economic communities in 
Africa in view of regional integration being central in the continent’s efforts to boost 
intraregional and global trade. A thorough discussion of relevant key terms and definitions is 
undertaken in section two, to provide clarity and consistency on the concepts used in this study.  
Section three will further provide insight on the costs and benefits derived from sharing a 
common currency to motivate the importance of investigating the impact a currency union can 
have on trade. An account on the formation and the lessons drawn from the EU experience is 
given in section 4.  The detailed background and operations of the seven African Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) recognised by the AU is outlined in the fifth section. An 
overview of the progress with regards to economic and political integration of the different 
RECs and a summary of the relevant findings concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 Definition of a currency union 
A currency union is defined by Masson (2006) as a geographical area characterised by a group 
of countries  throughout which a single currency circulates as the principal medium of 
exchange. A currency union which is the culmination of monetary integration, also known as a 
monetary union or a common currency area, entails multiple countries ceding control over the 
supply of money to a common authority, usually a central bank. Monetary policy is a common 
tool utilised by national governments to manage economic shocks and changes in the money 
supply. By giving up control of its monetary policy a nation exposes itself to economic policy 
limitations. A monetary union is an extreme form of a fixed exchange rate regime whereby 
countries retain national currencies but agree to adjust the relative supply of these to maintain 
a desired rate of exchange (Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1994). Both exchange rate regimes are 
classified as hard pegs and differ in the degree of monetary independence they enjoy. While the 
monetary policies of member countries of a fixed exchange rate regime are determined by the 
anchor country’s monetary policy they still retain some degree of monetary policy 
independence, whereas member countries of a monetary union completely relinquish their 
monetary policy independence to a common central bank (Jefferis, 2007). Hard pegs have 
several advantages that include reduced transaction costs that traders incur when switching 
currencies in carrying out international transactions and low stable interest rates. 
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According to Chipeta and Mkandawire (1994) elements of a monetary union include; 
i) The adoption of a common single currency for all monetary union members. 
ii) A common monetary and fiscal policy to ensure collective control over the rate of 
money creation and the expansion of government expenditure. 
iii) Management of a union of the common pool of the foreign exchange reserves, external 
debt and exchange rate policy. 
iv) Convergence of domestic credit achieved by imposing a credit ceiling although the 
allocation and distribution of domestic credit between sectors remains with the national 
monetary authorities. 
v) In the case of the adoption of a common currency, the existence of a central bank serving 
as a regional monetary authority that becomes the sole issuer of the common currency. 
vi) A common development bank that serves to finance regional and national projects to 
assist in the integration process of member nations and to reduce economic differences between 
members. 
 
Monetary integration can take many forms and can be considered as a process ranging from no 
monetary and policy integration to a full monetary union. Table 1 summarises the different 
stages of monetary integration and the policy implication at each stage. The four stages of 
monetary integration and their respective characteristics are; 
i) No monetary integration (floating exchange rates, no monetary policy harmonisation) 
ii) Weak monetary integration (linked exchange rates and capital mobility, partial 
monetary policy co-ordination) 
iii) Strong monetary integration (fixed exchange rate, monetary policy harmonisation) 
iv) Full monetary integration (monetary union, single currency, single central bank) 
 
Under stage 1, no monetary integration, there is no attempt to co-ordinate the monetary policies 
of different countries, although it is possible that national monetary policies can move together 
with other countries if they experience similar external shocks. The exchange rates will be 
freely floating against each other and countries will have monetary policy autonomy. Under 
stage 2 exchange rates are to some extent linked either through a managed float that constrains 
exchange rates within a predetermined band or a crawling peg arrangement.  In a crawling peg 
regime, authorities announce a central parity and the associated maximum and minimum 
margins of fluctuations around the central parity. Depending on the flexibility of capital 
mobility this might have an implication on monetary policy autonomy with more autonomy 
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being experienced if a country retains capital control. Under stage 3, strong monetary 
integration, the exchange rates of national currencies are pegged to each other. In the case of 
full capital mobility, a common monetary policy will be followed with co-ordinated movement 
in interest rates. The last stage, full monetary union, is the conclusion of the process of monetary 
integration where all member nations commit to adopt a single common currency and a single 
central bank that manages monetary policy. Member countries give up their monetary or 
exchange rate policy autonomy. 
 
Table 1. Monetary Integration Stages 
Policy Choice Degree of Monetary Integration 
None Weak Strong Full 
Exchange Rate Floating Constrained Float/ 
Crawling Peg 
Fixed Peg Single Currency 
Capital Market  Exchange (Capital) 
controls possible 
Progressive removal of capital controls  
Equal treatment across jurisdictions  
Other  Removal of controls on labour mobility 
Stricter limits on fiscal deficits and public debt 
Trade liberalisation, Stabilisation of financial sector and 
strengthening of supervision 
Monetary Policy 
Implication 
Unconstrained Constrained by 
exchange rate targets 
and capital movement 
Co-ordinated 
movements in 
interest rates 
Single central bank 
and benchmark 
interest rate 
 
Source: (Jefferis, 2007) 
 
2.3 Criteria for a successful currency union 
Mundell's (1961) theory of optimum currency area argues that a currency union will tend to be 
less costly for countries that experience high convergence of economic variables as opposed 
other countries in the union. He further postulated that the effectiveness of an optimum currency 
area can be constrained by the immobility of factors of production, that is, labour and capital, 
because shifts in demand facing one country relative to another can lead to unemployment in 
the absence of a flexible exchange rate regime. He also highlighted that price and wage 
flexibility are also important for a country coping with demand shocks. Another prerequisite 
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for a successful monetary union is the need for a similar economic structure in terms of market 
openness, trade patterns and product diversification. Similar levels of per capita income among 
member unions are important because countries that generally have the same income levels 
tend to have similar levels of institutional development and a shared convergence interest. Free 
trade between countries in a union, flexible prices and a financial system with common rules 
and supervision makes for a mutually beneficial monetary union. In the absence of the factors 
highlighted a monetary union could be disadvantageous to the member countries if they fail to 
respond to shocks using suitable policies and this will result in lower growth and ultimately 
poverty. The criteria identified above were illustrated by the EMU through the establishment 
of a free trade area followed by a customs union, followed by the removal of controls on capital 
and labour movements and the introduction of a common currency (the Euro). This eliminated 
transaction costs between members and ensured the convergence of national fiscal positions. 
 
The potential benefits of a monetary union include generating fiscal discipline for governments 
that will limit their propensity to pursue irresponsible macroeconomic policies. A monetary 
union also limits the incidences of currency speculation and contagion effects that can 
contribute to exchange rate volatility. In addition, an optimum currency area facilitates the 
exploitation of economies of scale in the financial sector that will create greater efficiency. 
Lastly the potential increase in trade accruing from reduced transaction costs and exchange rate 
stability. On the contrary, a monetary union comes with potential losses resulting from reduced 
national autonomy and therefore a constrained ability to respond to economic shocks. An 
optimum currency area therefore is attainable when the benefits of monetary unification 
outweigh the costs associated with monetary integration. 
 
2.4 Overview of the EU 
2.4.1 The formation of the EMU and its sustainability 
The EMU was a culmination of sequencing of processes, starting with trade integration through 
the common market, which is similar to the RECs that already exist in Africa. An investigation 
of the origins of the EMU will shed light on the sustainability of currency integration in Africa 
specifically Southern Africa. Sadeh and Verdun (2009) suggest currency integration was 
motivated by increasing globalisation which encouraged the quest for international uniformity. 
Neo-functionalists argue that the formation of the EMU was propelled by the trade integration 
among EU member countries. The lack of a common currency between these member countries 
was one of the only trade barriers that remained after completing the internal market project. 
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The Mundell-Fleming model argues that a country’s government cannot simultaneously 
maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent monetary policy 
that can be used to achieve domestic policy goals. It must choose any of the two for control and 
leave the other for market forces. This is known as the impossible trinity (Wyplosz, 2001). In 
the context of EMU member countries, the freeing of capital flows between countries as part 
of the single market project6 meant that exchange rate stability could only come at the expense 
of a country’s independent monetary policy. Therefore, the formation of the EMU was a natural 
extension to the single market project (Padoa-Schioppa, 2000). Scholars largely agree that the 
formation of the EMU was and remains a politically motivated endeavour, motivated by the 
continental desire to minimize the destabilizing effect of the US economic and foreign policies 
(Sadeh & Verdun, 2009). Another school of thought presents the formation of a currency union 
as a political alliance that is dependent on the balance of national interests (Beetsman & 
Giuliodori, 2010). For France the EMU was attractive for gaining more control of interest rates. 
On the other hand, Germany traded control of their monetary policy for international 
legitimacy, lower cost for its unification and economic advantage for its industry. At a domestic 
level the formation of the EMU was largely supported by the big businesses, multinationals, 
high-tech industries as well as labour organisations and was viewed as explaining the 
macroeconomic convergence period of the EMU process but not necessarily all the other phases 
(Sadeh & Verdun, 2009). 
 
2.4.2 Lessons for Africa’s Regional Economic Communities from the EMU 
Europe’s successful integration was a sequencing of gradually increasing co-operation that 
developed from one form to another. Initially trade integration was achieved with fixed but 
adjustable exchange rates, while keeping domestic and external financial markets under tight 
control. A thirty-year process saw the liberalisation of financial markets and exchange rate 
stability stemming from the common market. Through the establishment of the common 
market, Europe was able to achieve the minimum degree of real convergence that is necessary 
for the viability of a currency union. Continued integration in Europe has been attributed to the 
existence of collective institutions such as the common market and the ECB. These collective 
institutions become the driving force for integration through allowing for professional 
assessments and analysis that will aid in eliminating potentially costly mistakes. Real economic 
convergence refers to the stage of development a country has achieved and is not only limited 
                                                 
6 The European single market project, also known as the internal market or common market project, is a single 
market which seeks to guarantee the free movement of goods, capital, services and labour within the EU. 
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to trade integration but also monetary integration. Convergence is more complicated the wider 
the economic gap between countries (Wyplosz,2001). 
 
2.5 Overview of Regional Economic Communities in Africa 
2.5.1 Introduction 
The broader objective of the African Union (AU) to establish an African Economic community 
by 2021 is now being pursued through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as trade has 
been identified as a powerful tool for economic growth and development. Regional monetary 
unions are envisaged by the AU as building blocks towards an eventual continent-wide 
monetary union. A central aim of a monetary union is to reduce transaction costs and 
uncertainties that arise from exchanging one currency to another, allowing for greater price 
transparency since all goods are priced in the same currency. The AU currently recognises eight 
RECs as detailed in Table 2 below, namely the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
(CEN-SAD) the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of Western Africa (ECOWAS) the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). Other than the stated RECs other regional economic communities also 
exist, and these include Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the CMA with some 
member countries having membership in more than one of these trade arrangements. 
 
Table 2. Regional Integration Arrangements in Africa 
 
Acronym Full Name Year 
Established 
Member States Goal 
AMU Arab Maghreb Union 1989 Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and 
Tunisia 
Full economic 
union 
ECCAS Economic Community of 
Central African States 
1983 Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo (DRC), 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and 
Príncipe  
Full economic 
union 
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States 
1998 Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Free trade 
association 
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Source: (African Capacity Building Foundation, 2016) 
 
2.5.2 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
As detailed on the ECOWAS website (http://www.ecowas.int) the grouping was established in 
Abuja, Nigeria through a treaty signed on the 28th of May 1975. The Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of 15 nations. The 15 ECOWAS member 
states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Its major goal was to 
promote cooperation and development amongst member states in all fields of monetary activity. 
In 1993, ECOWAS broadened its mandate, following a revision of its original treaty, to 
encompass issues of monetary, socio-political, and cultural policies, with the goal of ultimately 
forming a monetary union. According to the survey conducted by the African Capacity Building 
Foundation (2016) the largest economy inside the ECOWAS sub-region is Nigeria, which is 
also Africa’s most populous country, accounting for 73.4 percent of the sub-region’s actual 
Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 
Togo, and Tunisia  
COMESA  
  
 
Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa; 
followed PTA 
1993 Burundi, Comoros, Congo (DRC), Djibouti, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Eswatini, Uganda, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe 
Full economic 
union 
EAC   
 
East African Community 2000 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and 
Uganda 
Political 
federation 
ECOWAS  
 
 
Economic Community of 
West African States 
1975 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Togo 
Full economic 
union 
IGAD  
   
 
Intergovernmental Authority 
for Development 
1996 Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda Eritrea joined 
in 1993 but suspended membership in 2007 
Full economic 
union 
SADC  
  
 
Southern African 
Development Community 
1992 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe 
Full economic 
union 
 14 
 
GDP and up to 19 percent of Africa’s overall GDP. Ghana, the sub-region’s second-largest 
economy, represents 8 percent of ECOWAS exports, far lower than Nigeria, but considerably 
higher than Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, which rank as the smallest economies of the sub-
region. Like most of Africa, the services sector of ECOWAS member states leads in economic 
significance, comprising 44.8 percent of general regional GDP, followed by agriculture (33.8 
percent), and enterprise (21 percent).  
 
Despite developments in the free movement of people, infrastructural development, 
improvement of telecom links amongst member states, and preservation of peace and security, 
sub-regional market integration has been very slow. The achievements have not significantly 
translated into increased intraregional enterprise. Intragroup exports still only account for 9 
percent of total ECOWAS trade, compared with 20 percent for the East Africa Community 
(EAC) and 17 percent for the Southern African Development Community (SADC).  Even 
though member states attempt to overcome language barriers and geopolitical challenges, the 
divide amongst Anglophone and Francophone states, and to some extent, the Lusophone states, 
still complicate the integration efforts. In 1994, a sub-group of eight-member states, except for 
Guinea-Bissau whose administrative structure imitates that of France, formed the West African 
Financial and Economic Union (WAEMU). These member states have a common currency, the 
CFA franc, which was inherited at independence and its convertibility is guaranteed by France’s 
Treasury. Additionally, this sub-group has a commonplace economic policy implemented with 
the aid of a common valuable financial institution, the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique 
de l’Ouest (BCEAO). As a result, the WAEMU nations have made more progress toward 
financial integration than the rest of the ECOWAS nations. The non-WAEMU nations, except 
for Cabo Verde, have consequently formed the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), which 
aims to in the end merge with WAEMU to form a single ECOWAS monetary region. However, 
progress has been slow and the ECOWAS-WAEMU convergence remains elusive (African 
Capacity Building Foundation, 2016). 
 
2.5.3 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) website 
(http://wwwcomesa.int) provides a background on COMESA. COMESA is a group of 19-
member states and was founded in 1993 as a successor to the Preferential Trade Area for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). The PTA was established in 1981 as part of the framework 
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) whose treaty terms required the PTA’s 
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transformation into a common market, 10 years after its establishment. COMESA formally 
succeeded the PTA on 8 December 1994 upon the treaty’s ratification by 11 signatory states. 
The REC has 19-member states that include Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Eswatini, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. COMESA was mainly established to take 
advantage of a larger market size, share the region’s common heritage and destiny, and allow 
greater social and economic cooperation, with the ultimate objective of joining the African 
Economic Community. COMESA’s principal focus is promoting regional integration through 
trade development, investment promotion, and sustainable use of natural resources for the 
mutual benefit of all citizens. The COMESA approach to regional integration is the classical, 
stage-by-stage gradual method of progressing from preferential trade area (PTA) to free trade 
area (FTA) to customs union to common market and eventual monetary union. By 2025, 
COMESA expects to be a single trade and investment area in which tariffs, non-tariffs, and 
other impediments to the movement of goods, services, capital, and people will seize to exist. 
By then, the region also expects to have achieved global market competitiveness in goods and 
services trade, while doubling per-capita income thanks to steady expansion of the regional 
economy. Statistics from the survey conducted by African Capacity Building Foundation 
(2016) indicate that COMESA’s largest economy is Egypt, accounting for 37 percent of the 
sub-region’s total GDP, followed by Sudan (9.6 percent), Libya (8.8 percent) and Kenya (8.8 
percent). The services sector accounts for 51.5 percent of total GDP in the COMESA sub-
region, followed by industry (27.4 percent) and agriculture (21.1 percent). Leading countries 
when it comes to services are Seychelles (81.3 percent share of GDP), Djibouti (75.7 percent), 
and Mauritius (72.2 percent).  
 
COMESA is ahead of other African RECs in terms of advancements in trade and trade 
facilitation. 14 of the 19-member states have so far signed up to the COMESA Free Trade Area, 
where all goods originating from the region are granted duty-free, quota-free market access to 
all other members of the COMESA FTA which happens to be Africa’s largest FTA. The most 
successful COMESA institutions include the Clearing House, which has now established an 
international payment system called the Regional Payment and Settlement System, the Leather 
Products Institute, and the Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
COMESA’s financial institutions, including the PTA Bank, the Re-insurance Agency, and the 
African Trade Insurance Agency, have spread throughout Africa and enjoy excellent global 
rankings. More than 20 years after the establishment of COMESA, the free movement of people 
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within the bloc is still an elusive goal. Member states are either unwilling or too slow to ratify 
the protocol which would eliminate restrictions on such travel. So far, only four countries 
(Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Zimbabwe) have signed the protocol, and only Burundi has fully 
ratified it. Mauritius, Rwanda, and Seychelles have also waived visa requirements for citizens 
of all COMESA member states, while Zambia has issued a circular waiving visas and visa fees 
for all COMESA nationals on official business (African Capacity Building Foundation, 2016). 
 
2.5.4 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
 According to The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) website (http://www.umaghrebarabe.org) the 
REC was founded in Marrakesh on 17 February 1989 by the five signers of the Constitutive 
Treaty of the Union: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. The treaty took effect 
on 1 July 1989. At its signing, member states agreed to coordinate, harmonize, and rationalize 
their policies and strategies for sustainable development in all sectors of human activity. The 
five North African states fashioned the AMU after the European Union (EU), originally 
intending to create a body through which members could negotiate trade relationships with the 
EU and improve relations among its member states. Specifically, the AMU sets out the 
conditions for an eventual free trade zone among member states, a unified customs regime for 
extra-union trade, and a common market where people, products, and capital circulate freely. 
However, hopes for substantial political and economic integration in the Maghreb region 
quickly dimmed as inter-state political tension–especially between Morocco and Algeria over 
the status of Western Sahara–complicated the union’s consolidation. Indeed, no summit of 
AMU heads of state has taken place since 1994. More recently, political instability sparked by 
the Arab Spring uprisings has created further uncertainty about the union’s future. The AMU 
has become more active as relations between Algeria and Morocco have improved. Since 1999, 
it has established several joint bodies to address common concerns, including the Maghrebi 
Bank for Investment and External Trade, the Working Group on Fisheries, and the Maghrebi 
Desertification Observatory. The African Capacity Building Foundation (2016) survey found 
that Industry (mining, manufacturing and construction) comprised 43.2 percent, and services 
44.8 percent, of the sub-region’s GDP. The five AMU states envision an investment bank, 
capitalized at $100 million, to partner with the private sector to fund regional infrastructure 
projects in Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. But the bank’s launch first 
proposed in 1991 with equal participation from each country has been delayed by political 
tensions within the union, and by a long-running dispute between Algeria and Morocco over 
Western Sahara. 
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2.5.5 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
According to the ECCAS website (http://www.ceeac.eccas.org) the REC was established in 
1983. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) grew out of the Economic 
Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) and the Central African Customs and 
Economic Union (UDEAC). Its original objective was to promote exchange among member 
states and provide an institutional and legal framework for such cooperation, but the goal of 
ECCAS is now to accelerate Central Africa’s physical, economic, and monetary integration. 
Current members are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, 
Congo (Brazzaville), DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
ECCAS has overlapping membership with the Central African Monetary Union (CEMAC), to 
which Chad, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe 
belong. In its first decade of existence, ECCAS performed poorly, largely a consequence of its 
members’ lack of commitment and failure to pay their quotas (African Capacity Building 
Foundation, 2016). The DRC war was particularly divisive, with Rwanda and Angola fighting 
on opposing sides. In 1998, ECCAS was revived, and its agenda was restructured and 
broadened to include not only economic but political and security issues as well. However, 
despite these laudable programs, ECCAS does not operate optimally due to the conflict and 
social strife. In addition, it has very weak institutional and organizational capacity, and lacks a 
critical mass of competent professional and support staff to drive the regional integration plan. 
ECCAS member states derive the largest share of their revenues from industry (47 percent), 
followed by services (34 percent) and agriculture (18.3 percent), This contrasts with Africa’s 
other RECs, which depend more on services. The ECCAS sub-region is blessed with enormous 
natural resources: a vast forest that can absorb about 500 million tons of carbon dioxide; huge 
deposits of diamonds, uranium, gold, copper, iron, cobalt, manganese, columbite-tantalites, and 
other minerals; and estimated proven oil reserves of 31.3 billion barrels, about 28 percent of 
Africa’s total. ECCAS member states also have huge agricultural potential; ample water 
resources, thanks to the Congo-Oubangui-Sangha Basin, the Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes 
region, and internal navigable waterways. It also has vast hydroelectricity generating potential, 
dominated by the Inga dam in the DRC’s Bas-Congo region, which alone represents 60 percent 
of Africa’s potential hydroelectric generating capacity. In addition, Central Africa’s strategic 
position could make it a future transit hub, as it is the only region that borders all of Africa’s 
other regions. Yet all these opportunities need capacity building to be effectively coordinated 
and implemented within the ECCAS agenda (African Capacity Building Foundation, 2016). 
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2.5.6 East African Community (EAC) 
East Africa has a long history of regional integration that dates back to the 1917 creation of the 
original East African Community by Kenya and Uganda, which Tanganyika (the predecessor 
to today’s Tanzania) joined in 1927 as detailed on the EAC website (http://www.eac.int). The 
current EAC, established on 7 July 2000, has its roots in the Mediation Agreement for Division 
of Assets and Liabilities of the original EAC, which collapsed for a variety of political and 
economic reasons in 1977. In that agreement, signed 14 May 1984, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda agreed to explore areas of future cooperation, and make concrete arrangements for such 
cooperation. Subsequent meetings of the three heads of state led to the signing of the Agreement 
for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission (PTC) for East African 
Cooperation on 30 November 1993. Full-fledged cooperation began 14 March 1996 with the 
launching of the PTC Secretariat at EAC headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. In June 2007, 
Burundi and Rwanda joined the original members, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The five 
states with a common history and culture founded the EAC to pursue their vision of a 
prosperous, competitive, secure, stable, and politically united East Africa. Their goal is to be 
an economic area (including customs and monetary unions, with harmonized macroeconomic 
policies, and ultimately a political federation), to better compete in the global market, improve 
conditions for domestic industries, and increase trade and investment in the region, which in 
turn will improve the quality of life for all East Africans. The EAC Customs Union became 
operational in January 2005, the protocol to establish it having been signed only in March 2004. 
In 2007, Rwanda and Burundi became full members of the EAC, but would not join the customs 
union until two years later. Talks aimed at merging the EAC, COMESA, and SADC into one 
free trade area began in 2008 at the Tripartite Summit held in Kampala, Uganda. At the EAC’s 
10th anniversary in 2009, the Protocol for the Establishment of the EAC Common Market was 
signed. A year later, the EAC Common Market Protocol entered into force, following 
ratification by all the five EAC partner states. According to the African Capacity Building 
Foundation (2016) survey, of Africa’s eight RECs, the East African Community has registered 
the most progress the on integration. While the others are in the process of establishing either 
free trade areas or customs unions, only the EAC has developed a fully functional FTA. It did 
this by first implementing a customs union that linked Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; Rwanda 
and Burundi joined the other three in July 2009. A year later, the EAC established a common 
market, and in 2013, it adopted a protocol outlining its plan to form a monetary union in 10 
years, an ambitious move unmatched by any other African REC. To monitor its progress, the 
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EAC has published The East African Common Market Score Card 2014. It tracks EAC 
compliance in the movement of capital, services and goods. The report showed that Tanzania 
and Burundi are the most restrictive when it comes to cross-border trade. In addition, cargo 
transit times have been slashed from 18 to 4 days from Kenya’s port of Mombasa to Kampala, 
Uganda, and from 21 to 6 days from Mombasa to Kigali, Rwanda. Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda 
have introduced a single tourist visa, and markets are emerging for the movement of 
professionals within the region through a framework for mutual recognition of professional 
standards (Drummond and Williams, 2015). 
 
2.5.7 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
According to the SADC website (http://www.sadc.int), the initiative for the establishment of 
structures to promote cooperation between member states was propelled by Frontline States, 
which originally comprised Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. Although 
politically independent, these countries faced mass poverty, economic backwardness, and the 
threat of powerful and hostile white minority-ruled neighbours. Hence, the leaders of these 
Frontline States saw the promotion of economic and social development through cooperation 
and integration as the next logical step for economic emancipation. This led to the launch of 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) at an April 1980 
summit in Lusaka, Zambia by the region’s nine majority-ruled states at the time. These were 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.  SADCC’s goals were to reduce economic dependence particularly, but not only, 
on South Africa; to forge links to create real and equitable regional integration; to mobilize 
resources to put in place national and regional policies; and to take concerted action to secure 
global cooperation within the framework of economic liberation. The need to strengthen 
SADCC, which became apparent in the late 1980s, led to the signing of a treaty transforming 
the coordination conference into SADC, the community. Formed in 1992, SADC hoped to 
address many of the factors that make it difficult to sustain economic growth and 
socioeconomic development, such as continued dependence on the exports of a few primary 
commodities. In the 1990s, membership in SADC rose to 15 with the accession of Namibia in 
1990, South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, and Seychelles and the DRC in 1997. 
Madagascar’s membership was reinstated in January 2014 after an imposed suspension in 2009. 
 
 Statistics from the African Capacity Building Foundation (2016) survey found that the region 
covers 9,864,775 square kilometres and has a total population of 293 million. SADC’s 
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merchandise trade products are dominated by minerals, lubricants, and related materials (35 
percent), followed by manufactured goods (21.9 percent) and crude materials (10.2 percent). 
This trade composition is especially different from that of most African RECs like ECOWAS, 
ECCAS, COMESA, and IGAD, where trade compositions are led mainly by primary 
commodities.  SADC’s intraregional trade policies have paid off over the years, redirecting 
exports from the rest of the world to the regional level. Perhaps this is due to the economic 
activities of South Africa’s neighbours (Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Eswatini) all of which depend 
deeply on the South African economy. Indeed, South Africa is a strategic hub for most SADC 
states; 10 of them count South Africa as one of their top five trading partners. Therefore, any 
economic and trade policy shifts by South Africa will have high multiplier effects on the other 
SADC members. On 10 June 2015, the Heads of State and Government of SADC, the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC) 
met in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, at the Third Tripartite Summit to officially launch the 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). This TFTA represents an 
integrated market of 26 nations with a combined population of 632 million, which is 57 percent 
of Africa’s population; its GDP of $1.3 trillion represents 58 percent of Africa’s total GDP. 
Establishment of the TFTA will clearly bolster intraregional trade by creating a wider market, 
boosting investment flows, enhancing competitiveness and encouraging regional infrastructure 
development. In line with its vision and agenda, SADC set up several ambitious targets but has 
failed to achieve most of them. A trade protocol signed by 11 of the sub-region’s 15-member 
states in 2000 sought to liberalize 85 percent of intraregional trade by 2008 and 100 percent of 
trade by 2012. It also hoped to form a regional customs union by 2010. All these targets have 
been missed. Efforts to establish a common market by 2012 and a monetary union by 2016 
have also not been achieved. Finally, nearly all SADC members have shown a propensity to 
promote their own national economic and political interests, contrary to the regional vision 
enshrined in its protocols. This partly explains why southern Africa has been so slow to 
implement accords that encourage regional integration. Multiple and concurrent memberships 
to numerous regional economic communities (RECs) have presented the most daunting 
challenge to regional economic integration within SADC. South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, 
and Eswatini are members of both SADC and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), 
headquartered in Windhoek, Namibia, while Namibia and Eswatini both hold memberships in 
three regional integration pacts and belong to the Common Monetary Area, which also includes 
South Africa and Lesotho. In addition, 9 of SADC’s 15 members also belong to COMESA. 
Consequently, multiple memberships are not only costly, but they also create inefficiencies, 
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and are partly responsible for the limited capacity and success of SADC and other RECs. South 
Africa’s control of SADC is an obstacle to regional integration. This one country accounts for 
over 60 percent of all intra-SADC trade and about 70 percent of the subgroup’s total GDP. 
Given this vast economic power asymmetry between South Africa and other SADC and SACU 
members, the country cannot be treated as an equal partner. The result is that South Africa has 
been able to flout regulations without much protest from other members. It is also negotiating 
its own Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU rather than on behalf of the regional 
bloc. 
 
2.5.8 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
In 1996 according to the IGAD website (http://www.igad.int), IGAD replaced the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, which had been established in 1986 
by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, in the aftermath of a 12-year 
drought that had caused widespread famine, ecological degradation, and economic decline 
throughout the Horn of Africa. The revitalized body, meeting in Djibouti, expanded its mandate 
to coordinate and harmonize policies in the areas of socioeconomic and agricultural 
development, environmental protection, and political and humanitarian affairs. Following its 
re-engineering, the African Union meeting in Banjul in July 2006, recognized IGAD as a strong 
and viable regional economic community (REC). A January 2008 protocol on the relationship 
between the AU and Africa’s RECs recognized IGAD as a full-fledged REC, rejecting a high-
level recommendation that would have relegated it to an organization dealing only with peace 
and security as well as desertification matters. IGAD’s membership increased to eight nations 
after Eritrea gained independence in 1993; South Sudan followed suit in 2011. IGAD’s mission 
is to “promote regional cooperation and integration to add value to member states’ efforts in 
achieving peace, security, and prosperity.” Among IGAD nations, landlocked South Sudan had 
the highest industry share, at 59.6 percent. South Sudan, which joined the regional bloc in 2011, 
is almost 100 percent reliant on crude oil exports to China and Japan. Similarly, industry 
accounted for 23 percent of Eritrea’s total GDP in 2013, sustained mainly from exports of gold, 
silver, iron ore, and other high-value minerals. While other RECs have pursued customs unions, 
free trade agreements, and even common currencies among their members, IGAD has yet to 
take even the most basic steps toward regional economic integration; its plan to create a free 
trade area by 2012 never materialized. Indeed, as the Horn of Africa suffers, integration remains 
very low on the IGAD agenda, with few achievements recorded in the last decade. Parallel 
membership in other integration schemes has had a particularly negative impact on the 
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effectiveness of IGAD. Kenya, for example, belongs to five regional schemes (IGAD, 
COMESA, EAC, CEN-SAD, and ICGLR), while Uganda and Sudan each belong to 4 (IGAD, 
COMESA, EAC, and ICGLR). Kenya and Uganda are also more deeply committed to the EAC. 
Elsewhere in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea continues to use force to settle policy differences with 
its neighbours, Ethiopia remains oblivious to regional markets, and Somalia has little control 
over its own trade, diplomacy, and macroeconomic policy (African Capacity Building 
Foundation, 2016). 
 
2.5.9 Continental Free Trade Area 
At the 18th Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government of the AU held in Addis 
Ababa Ethiopia according to the AU website (https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about),  a decision was 
adopted to establish a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). The proposed CFTA which was 
expected to be launched in 2017 will bring together 44 African countries. These African 
Countries have a combined GDP of US $3.4 Trillion and a combined estimated population of 
more than 1 Billion. The main objectives of the CFTA include establishing a continental 
customs union that will foster a single market for goods and services, with the free movement 
of labour and capital across borders. The CFTA is also envisioned to increase intra-African 
trade through the improved harmonization and coordination of trade liberalisation and 
facilitation across the African RECs. This initiative is also expected to stimulate 
competitiveness at the industry and enterprise level through access to a wider continental 
market and the effective reallocation of factors of production. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
As shown in Figure 2, a REC that focuses its mandate on a specific pillar of regional integration 
tends to complete that stage much more quickly. For example, COMESA is closer to 
completing the only pillar on which its mandate is focused which is the creation of a free trade 
area with 16 of its 19-member states having ratified the common market protocols. On the other 
hand, RECs that focused on many regional integration pillars simultaneously appear to have 
difficulties completing any one of these intended pillars. This is evidently the case with 
ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD. ECCAS is now focused on resolving Central Africa’s 
political crisis at the expense of other crises. ECOWAS has inaugurated its FTA and plans to 
launch a customs union, but faces many obstacles, including the hesitation of some member 
states to fully engage themselves in sensitive areas like a free trade area or a common currency. 
EAC seems to be an exception, with remarkable progress in all pillars. Three of its main pillars 
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are effective: political and economic integration, as well as monetary integration after the 
endorsement and ratification of the common currency protocol. AMU is relatively slower. It is 
still in the earliest stage of enhancing cooperation among its member states. 
 
Figure 2. Level of completion for each of the regional integration stages by pillar 
 
Source: (The African Capacity Building Foundation, 2016) 
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide the theory behind international trade and a review of the literature on 
the application of the gravity model to assess the impact of a currency union on the volume of 
bilateral trade. To answer the question of why countries trade, an overview of international 
trade theories is given. These include the classical trade theory, the new trade theory and the 
gravity model. A summary of the relevant findings concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 International Trade Theories  
The Classical Trade Theory is founded in Adam Smith’s Absolute Advantage Theory of trade 
and it postulates that the extent to which a country exports and imports relates to its trading 
pattern with other nations. That is, countries can gain if each devotes resources to the generation 
of goods and services in which they have an economic advantage (Smith,1776). Smith’s 
arguments, though relevant for a country which has an absolute advantage in the production of 
a specific good, do not explain how a country which lacks an absolute advantage in production 
can still benefit from international trade. David Ricardo extended Adam Smith’s theory and 
established a fundamental theory of international trade, known as the principles of comparative 
advantage. According to Ricardo (1817), a nation gains from trade by exporting the goods or 
services in which it has its greatest comparative advantage in productivity and importing those 
it has the least comparative advantage.   Therefore, the Classical Trade Theory effectively 
describes the scenario where a country generates goods and services in which it has an 
advantage, for consumption indigenously, and subsequently exports the surplus. Consequently, 
it is sensible for countries to import those goods and services in which they have an economic 
disadvantage. Economic advantages or disadvantages may arise from country differences in 
factors such as resource endowments, labour, capital, technology or entrepreneurship. Thus, the 
Classical Trade Theory contends that the basis for international trade can be sourced to 
differences in production characteristics and resource endowments which are founded on 
domestic differences in natural and acquired economic advantages. However, even though the 
Ricardian model is a basis for international trade, it is still deficient. The model assumes an 
unrealistic degree of specialization and that all countries benefit from trade (Morgan & 
Katsikeas, 1997). 
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The classical theory of trade is prone to several shortcomings, which motivated nineteenth and 
twentieth century economists to modify the existing theory of trade. Ohlin (1952) developed an 
influential theory known as the Factor Proportion Theory or the Hecksher-Ohlin model. The 
Factor Proportion Theory, in contrast to the Classical Trade Theory, can provide an explanation 
for the differences in advantage exhibited by trading countries. According to this theory, 
countries will tend to export goods and services that utilise their abundant production factors 
that they possess intensively, while they will import goods and services that utilise scarce 
production factors intensively (Thai, 2006). Therefore, this theory extends the concept of 
economic advantage by considering the endowment and costs of factors of production. The 
Hecksher-Ohlin model assumes that the only apparent differences between countries is the 
relative endowment of factors of production, the technologies utilised are assumed to be the 
same. This is contrary to the Ricardian model which assumes production technologies differ 
between countries. Generally, in the Hecksher-Ohlin model trade does not lead to complete 
specialisation between countries an assumption which remedies the defect of the Ricardian 
model which argues that trade leads to specialisation. The Hecksher-Ohlin model further 
distinguishes itself from the Ricardian model through the argument that not every country gains 
from trade, because of the income distribution effect inherent in international trade. The 
ultimate gainers from trade are the countries with abundant factors of production relative to 
those with scarce factors of production.   
Both these theories have been shown to be deficient in explaining more recent patterns of 
international trade, which motivated the establishment of the New Trade Theory by Krugman 
and Maurice (2005). The New Trade Theory seeks to explain the huge proportion of trade 
between nations with similar factor endowments. The New Trade Theory contradicts the 
Classical Trade Theory which suggests that countries which are less similar tend to trade more. 
The New Trade Theory explains international trade based on economies of scale imperfect 
competition and product differentiation which relax the strict assumptions of the classical 
theory of constant return of scale, perfect competition and homogenous goods. Under the 
assumptions of the New Trade Theory a country can specialise in producing a narrow range of 
products at a large scale with economies of scale. The said country can then increase the variety 
of goods available to its consumers through trade. Trade therefore occurs despite trading nations 
not having different factor endowments (Thai, 2006). 
Although the classical and the new trade theories can successfully explain the reason for 
countries to engage in international trade they however cannot answer the question of the size 
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of the trade flows. The gravity model has been used intensively to quantify the trade flow 
between countries. The model applies Newton’s theory of universal gravitation which relates 
the force of attraction between two objects to their respective masses and the distance between 
them. Tinbergen (1964) proposed that the same principle can be applied to explain the bilateral 
trade flows where trade is estimated as an increasing function of the trading partner’s income 
measured by a country’s GDP, and a decreasing function of the distance between them. Initially 
these models were criticised for lacking a proper theoretical justification. Anderson (1979) and 
Bergstrand (1985) were the first to formally attempt to address this criticism and derived the 
gravity equation theoretically. Dummy variables are included in the gravity equation in order 
to represent quantitative variables such as common language, trade agreements and currency 
union effects in bilateral trade. 
The following section will review empirical studies that have investigated the impact of 
currency unions on bilateral trade flows.   
3.3 Empirical Studies 
In his influential paper on the impact of currency unions on bilateral trade, Rose (2000) utilised 
an augmented gravity model of bilateral trade that included a currency union dummy variable 
as an independent variable. To estimate the effect of a currency union on trade a sample of 186 
countries was used. The primary objective of the paper was to resolve the standing argument 
that both a reduction in exchange rate volatility and a common currency influence trade and 
hence the respective effect can be measured separately. Rose (2000) further postulated that an 
increase in trade as a result of a common currency would lead to enhanced political and global 
integration through the synchronisation of business cycles across countries. To trace the effect 
of a currency union and exchange rate volatility on trade, a cross-sectional variation approach 
was used. A cross-sectional variation approach involves the use of data associated with the 
values of many different variables that are collected at a single point in time (Misman, 2017). 
The study identified 300 country pairs with common currencies and found that a common 
currency increases bilateral trade by three times the original level of trade, all things being 
equal. In a subsequent study conducted by Glick and Rose (2001) they argued that from a policy 
perspective, how much of an impact a currency union has on those countries that adopt it, is a 
pertinent question. To answer this question, the authors studied the impact of a currency union 
using panel data spanning 1948 to 1997. The panel data analysis allowed for more country pairs 
with periods in which they shared currencies as well as periods in which they did not. The 
results of their study indicated a doubling of trade for country pairs sharing a common currency. 
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Rose and van Wincoop, (2001) further investigated the trade-generating effect of currency 
union membership by using Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) structural model to address 
country-specific idiosyncrasies. This approach, which was applied only to countries with 
complete bilateral data, reduced the effect of currency unions on trade to about two-and-a-half 
times. 
 
 These results have generated immense interest and controversy in the academic community, 
and numerous studies have followed. One such critique was by Tenreyro (2001) who argued 
that the model used by Rose omitted some variables that could be pro-trade and correlated with 
the currency union dummy. This omission could have the effect of biasing the estimate 
upwards. Other critiques of the model were the presence of reverse causality in that bilateral 
trade flows could cause a common currency union rather than the other way around. Further, 
the model was argued to be prone to misspecification (Persson, 2001). Most of these studies 
point out methodological or data limitations in the earlier analyses and find a smaller impact of 
currency unions on trade. For example, Nitsch (2002) states that it is possible to find a 
specification in which the effect of currency unions on trade is essentially zero. Allowing for 
isolated effects of different languages, preferential trade arrangements and trading pairs that 
have a common coloniser, the estimated coefficient on the common currency dummy becomes 
statistically insignificant. Baldwin (2006) concludes in his study that the reasonable common 
currency effects for the EMU should be in the range of 5 to 15 percent increase in trade. Most 
of the criticism of the Rose effect found a reduced effect but arrived at the same conclusion that 
a positive relationship exists between countries adopting a common currency and an increase 
in bilateral trade. In general, these studies challenge the magnitude of the estimated effect of 
currency unions in the research conducted by Rose (2000), but do not question the validity of 
its existence or the direction of the effect. Subsequent work by Rose and other scholars found 
a reduced effect although it remained significant roughly a doubling of trade (Glick and Rose, 
2001).  
 
 In the findings by Masson and Pattillo (2004), restricting the sample to African countries and 
using the same methodology by Rose (2000), the resulting estimates of the common currency 
effect are like the conclusions drawn by Rose (2000). Tsangarides, Ewenczyk, Hulej, and 
Qureshi (2009) found that sharing a currency enhances trade and increases price co-movements 
but decreases the co-movement of shocks to real GDP (that is, increases specialization). 
Considering the potential and estimated impact of currency unions on trade, the African 
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continent presents an interesting case to assess the relative potential impact of currency unions 
and FTAs on intraregional and international trade. This is because the continent has a rich 
history of currency unions and preferential regional trade agreements in West Africa, but 
nonetheless world trade participation remains limited. According to Chipeta and Mkandawire 
(1994) “various explanations have been proposed for Africa's marginalization in global trade 
activity, including slow economic growth, unfavourable geographical and exogenous factors, 
poor infrastructure, ill-planned trade policies, weak governance and institutions, barriers to 
intraregional trade, and constraints on factor mobility”. Further, the substantial savings on 
transaction costs that accrue from a monetary union and imply an increase in trade benefits may 
be limited in Africa because of lower diversification and a heavy dependence on primary 
commodities (Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1994). The loss of nominal exchange rate flexibility 
makes real adjustments to asymmetric shocks more difficult, especially in view of the poor 
systems of fiscal transfers and the limited development of the banking and financial sectors. In 
this context, Asonuma, Debrun and Masson (2012) “show that gains from adopting a common 
currency depend, among other factors, on the correlation of terms-of-trade shocks. This, in turn, 
is connected to the countries' dependence on primary commodities and their prices”. They also 
show that joining a currency union or accepting a new member in a multilateral union is subject 
to the existence of interest groups. This observation is noteworthy as it implies that differences 
in government spending propensities may be more important than asymmetric shocks for the 
benefits/losses arising from joining a currency union.  
 
Using Glick and Rose's (2002) specification, Masson and Pattillo (2004) examine the impact 
of currency unions on trade in Africa. “Their estimated effect of currency unions on African 
bilateral trade with the rest of the world (ROW) is almost the same as for the world: currency 
unions increase trade threefold in both Africa and the world”. However, the currency union 
variable used by Masson and Pattillo (2004) uses the FTA definition from Glick and Rose 
(2002), which does not distinguish between FTA and currency union effects. Tsangarides et al 
(2009) overcome this limitation by constructing separate variables for FTA and currency unions 
and identifying their impacts separately. “Their findings suggest that African countries stand to 
benefit at least as much from currency union membership as other countries in the world; 
therefore, currency union benefits are not region-specific”. Specifically, the results show that 
countries belonging to a currency union trade, on average, about one-and-a-half times more 
with each other than with other comparable countries that do not share a currency. Carrere 
(2004) posits that African regional trade agreements have generated a significant increase in 
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trade between members, and further, currency unions have to a large extent increased the 
positive effects of these regional trade agreements on intra-regional trade. To assess the average 
impact of each regional trade agreement in Sub-Saharan Africa on trade, Carrere (2004) 
considers the period 1962 to 1996 and adopted an augmented gravity model in which specific 
dummy variables were assigned to allow for the observation of trade creation and trade 
diversion effects separately. The study by Nchake et al (2018) examining the effect of a 
monetary union on product market integration using disaggregated product price data from the 
emerging African economies of Botswana, South Africa and Lesotho, also found evidence to 
support the notion that the effective alignment in interest rate and exchange rate policies 
enhances the integration of product markets between trading countries. In his study Negasi 
(2009) analysed trade creation and diversion effects of SADC using data from 2000 to 2007 
and estimated an augmented gravity model. Contrary to other findings his results suggested that 
while SADC countries enter into trade agreements to enhance intra-SADC trade in the 
agricultural and light manufacturing sectors, they still have retained trade with the rest of the 
world thereby creating a negative trade diversion effect. 
 
-3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter summarizes relevant theoretical and empirical literature investigating the impact 
of currency unions on bilateral trade flows. An overview of international trade theories was 
given. These include the classical trade theory, the new trade theory and the gravity model. A 
summary of the relevant findings concludes the chapter. Thereafter, an investigation of the 
application of the gravity model was explored; and lastly, key findings from the empirical 
literature are highlighted. In light of the reviewed body of knowledge, this dissertation seeks to 
address the limited empirical evidence on the impact on trade of a hypothetical SADC currency 
union. 
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology that operationalizes the empirical approach 
undertaken by this study; and is organized into five distinct, yet unified main sections. The 
second section describes the data used in this study and its source. The third section presents 
the research approach; outlining the potential effect a currency union has on regional trade. The 
fourth section describes the estimation strategy and details the specification of the estimating 
equations. The fifth section addresses the reliability, validity, and limitations presented by this 
study. 
 
4.2 Data set 
In this dissertation, I estimated the effect of currency unions on trade exploiting time series (as 
well as cross-sectional) variation using the gravity model as exploited by Rose (2000). The 
dissertation used the direction of trade (DOT) data set developed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The DOT data set covered bilateral trade between 210 IMF country codes. The 
dissertation limited the analysis to just the 15-member countries of SADC covering the period 
from the year 2000 to 2017. Bilateral trade on free on board (FOB) exports and cost, insurance 
and freight (CIF) imports was recorded in United States dollars (USD). An average value for 
bilateral trade between a pair of countries was arrived at by averaging the four possible 
measures available7. The average value for bilateral trade was preferred as applied by Rose 
(2000) given the four available possible measures trade between a trading pair. Other control 
variables were added to this data set, that are necessary to estimate the gravity model. These 
added variables include population and real GDP data which were obtained from the World 
Bank’s “World Development Indicators”. Where information is missing observations were 
obtained from the IMF’s “International Financial Statistics”. For country specific variables that 
include land area, landlocked and island status, the distance between country pairs, common 
language shared and shared land border status, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) 
“World Factbook” and the “World Development Indicators” data were used. I obtained data 
from the World Trade Organization to create an indicator of regional trade agreements, 
specifically a country’s SADC membership status at a given time. The bilateral distance 
                                                 
7 That is the four-way uni-directional bilateral trade flows between two trading countries, country i and country j 
and these are, country i exports to country j, country j exports to country i, country i imports from country j and 
country j imports from country i.  
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between the different countries’ economic centres was also accessible on 
www.indo.com/distance and the “geodist” tool was used to measure the distance in kilometres. 
The “geodist” tool measures the geographic distance between a country’s capital city and the 
capital cities of respective partner countries. Lastly information was added on whether the pair 
of countries was involved in a currency union. By “currency union” I mean essentially that 
money was interchangeable between the two countries at a 1:1 par for an extended period of 
time, so that there was no need to convert prices when trading between a pair of countries. My 
basic source for currency union data is the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. The definition for a currency union is transitive in 
that if country x and y are in a currency union and country x and z are also in a currency union 
then it follows that country y and z are also in a currency union (Glick and Rose, 2001). 
 
4.3 Research Approach 
The estimation of the gravity equation is done by using ordinary least squares (OLS) to measure 
the coefficient of the gravity model in a panel data framework. The use of panel data 
methodology has several advantages relative to using the cross-section methodology. Panel data 
analysis makes it possible to capture the relevant relations among variables over time. Secondly 
panel data makes it easier to monitor the possible unobservable individual effects of a trading 
pair of countries. My approach was to use an econometric model that attempts to make 
predictions based on past performance. In this case trade between two partners was affected by 
their size and proximity. From the literature the random effects model (REM) would be more 
suitable when estimating typical trade flows between a randomly selected sample of trading 
partners from a large population. On the other hand, the fixed effects model (FEM) would be 
more ideal than REM when estimating typical trade flow between a predetermined selection of 
nations (Egger, 2002). Since my sample included all 15-member countries of the SADC the 
FEM was more suited to the analysis.  
  
4.4 Analytical Framework 
As adopted from the study by Rose (2000), the generalized gravity model of trade estimates the 
volume of average bilateral trade between pairs of countries, Xij, as a function of their incomes 
(GDPs), their populations, their geographical distance and a set of dummies and is given by; 
Xij = F(β0Yi β1Yjβ2Popiβ3Popjβ4Dijβ5Aijβ6εij)      (1) 
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Where Yi(Yj) indicate GDPs of the exporter(importer) Popi(Popj) are populations of the 
exporter(importer), Dij measures the distance between the two country’s economic centres, Aij 
represents other factors aiding or preventing trade between pairs of countries and εij is the error 
term. An alternative formulation of Equation (1) uses GDP per capita income instead of 
population, 
Xij = γ0Yi γ1Yjγ2YiPopiγ3YjPopjγ4Dijγ5Aijγ6εij                 (2) 
 
Where YiPopi(YjPopj) are the exporter(importer) GDP per capita, Equation (1) and Equation 
(2) are equivalent and the coefficients are expresses as: 
β3=-γ3, β4=-γ4, β1=γ1+γ4, β2=γ2+γ4 
For estimation purposes Equation (1) in loglinear form expressed for a single year is expressed 
as, 
ln(Xij) = β0 + β1ln(YiYj) + β2ln(YiYj/PopiPopj) + β3lnDij + β4Langij + β5Contij + β6FTAij + 
β7Landlij +β8ln(AreaiAreaj) + µCUij + εij      (3) 
 
The estimation of the gravity model in a panel data framework with individual effects for each 
trading pair is given by, 
 
ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1ln(YiYj)t + β2ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)t + β3lnDij + β4Langij + β5ComLij + β6FTAijt + 
β7Landlij +β8ln(AreaiAreaj) + µCUijt + εijt                      (4) 
 
Where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as: 
• Xijt denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between i and j at time t, 
• Y is real GDP, 
• Pop is population, 
• D is the distance between i and j, 
• Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language, 
• ComL is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border, 
• FTA is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade 
agreement, 
• Landl is a binary which is unity if either i or j is landlocked, 
• Area is the land mass of the country, 
• CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t, 
• β is a vector of nuisance coefficients, and 
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• εij represents the myriad of other influences on bilateral exports, assumed to be well 
behaved. 
 
The coefficient of interest to us is µ, the effect of a currency union on trade. I followed the norm 
in the literature by using ordinary least squares (OLS). However, if the error term of the 
regression is heteroscedastic the parameters estimated by OLS can be severely biased. Equation 
(4) estimates the effect of a currency union on regional trade in between SADC member country 
pairs. The model was augmented from the traditional version by omitting some left-side 
variables that account for a country’s colony or coloniser status because the DOT data being 
used is from 2000 to 2017 which is post the colonial era of all the SADC member countries. 
Bilateral trade flows are determined by the variables on the right side of the gravity equation. 
This gives a clear direction of causality that runs from income and distance to trade.   
 
      4.5 Reliability, Validity and Limitations 
      When employing the gravity model to estimate trade flows, several methodological issues arise 
that need to be taken into consideration. These issues are derived from various critiques of the 
estimation of the gravity equation and include the critiques by Baldwin (2005), as well as the 
critique on the correct functional form of the gravity equation pointed out by Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006). In as far as these critiques relate to the analysis presented in this dissertation, I discussed 
my attempts to address them through reliability and validity checks of the estimated results. 
First, because establishing a currency union or choosing to stay in a currency union may be an 
endogenous choice, reverse causality might explain some of the large trade-creating effects of 
a currency union. To solve the potential endogeneity problem, use of appropriate variables 
when estimating the gravity equation could be a solution. “However, identifying the appropriate 
variables for a currency union could prove to be a difficult undertaking, which is further 
complicated by the fact that currency union membership is proxied by a dummy variable” (Silva 
and Tenreyro, 2006). Nevertheless, attempts by Alesina and Barro (2002) to address the 
endogeneity problem using an appropriate variable based on importer-exporter relationship 
have shown that the effect of currency union on trade remains significant even after accounting 
for this potential endogeneity. In addition, Rose and van Wincoop (2001) “argue that reverse 
causality also does not explain away the findings; there is little evidence in the political science 
literature that countries join currency unions to increase trade, and instrumental variables only 
increase the impact of currency unions on trade." In my analysis I chose to treat currency unions 
as an exogenous variable with respect to trade.  Second, is the issue of the omitted variables 
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bias stemming from the correlation of any pro-trade omitted variables with the currency union 
dummy. This has been labelled as the "gold medal mistake" in Baldwin's (2005) critique. 
Research following Rose (2000) attempts to control for this bias by introducing country-
specific estimators in the model, both in the context of cross-section and panel data estimations. 
In cross-section analysis, country fixed effects (using country-specific dummy variables) can 
be introduced to account for Anderson and van Wincoop's (2003) "multilateral resistance" 
factor, according to which trade between two countries does not only depend on the 
characteristics of the countries but also on inherent barriers between them. However, given that 
there was a time- series element to the potential bias that is not eliminated with this procedure, 
I employed a panel data OLS effects procedure that adds country specific effects to the 
equation, and thus exploits the time-series dimension of the data around country averages.  
 
Finally, there are several issues relating to model misspecification. These include (1) the 
combining both exports and imports to represent the bilateral trade dependent variable (the 
"silver medal mistake" of Baldwin (2006); (2) possible nonlinear effects entering the gravity 
equation; and (3) the treatment of zero-trade observations in the sample. I attempted to address 
all these issues in my validity checks. On the derivation of the bilateral trade estimations, Nitsch 
(2002) argues that although theory supports the use of bilateral exports as the dependent 
variable, using bilateral trade as the dependent variable without taking into consideration both 
imports and exports can seriously bias the results. I addressed this critique by taking the 
dependent variable as the sum of the logarithms of exports and imports in addition to the 
logarithm of the sums, and re-estimating Equation (4). To address the possibility of nonlinear 
effects operating in gravity equation estimations (for example, due to sample non-
homogeneity), I added quadratic terms for both output and output per capita as in Glick and 
Rose (2002). “The issue of zero-trade observations arises because many observations in 
bilateral trade data sets appear as zeros either because some pairs of countries did not trade, or 
because of rounding errors and missing observations” (Olsson, 2013). Using the log-linear form 
of the gravity equation as in Equation (4) implies including only those observations for which 
the dependent variable is positive. Given that the value of trade flows between some pairs of 
countries (mostly pairs of economically small countries) tends to be zero, this may lead to a 
sample selection problem. The inclusion of zero observations may result in inconsistent 
estimators when OLS are used. It is suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to use the Tobit 
estimation method to account for the censored nature of the dependent variable of the model 
and to also apply the pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) approach. This approach takes the 
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real value of trade as the dependent variable and includes zero observations. An additional 
advantage of using the PML approach is that it may have a superior functional form than the 
log-linear gravity model. This is because, as noted by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), “Jensen's 
inequality can have important implications for log-linear models in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity: if the error term is heteroscedastic with the variance depending on the 
regressors, then the parameters estimated by OLS can be severely biased”. I checked the 
sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of zero-trade observations by perturbing the gravity 
equation estimation using 2 different specifications. The first specification includes all zero 
trade observations and the second specification substitutes the zero observations with a value 
of one.   
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section of the dissertation the results from the econometric equations and the summary 
of descriptive statistics will be presented and analysed. The method that was adopted for the 
regressions analysis is OLS. When executing the equations in Eviews, different specifications 
were used to establish the most robust and accurate results for comparison. Particularly, I 
conducted sensitivity checks of the specifications by estimating the dependent variable as the 
average of the logarithm of exports and imports (rather than the logarithm of the average) and 
by assuming a value of one on the country-pairs that have zero trade flow values. The different 
outcomes resulting from the different specifications will be presented and discussed separately 
in this section. For all the estimations, conventional significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
were used. After estimating the regression model, it was important to determine the validity of 
classical OLS assumptions before conducting inference. If violations of these assumptions are 
detected, subsequent inferential procedures may be invalid resulting in biased conclusions. In 
constructing my regression model, I assumed that the relationship between the explanatory 
variables and the dependent variables were linear in their coefficients and that the errors were 
independent and evenly distributed normal random variables with mean zero and constant 
variance (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). It was therefore crucial to perform appropriate model 
diagnostic tests. Following these tests, the appropriate estimation method was used to estimate 
the gravity model.  
 
The Hausman test was applied to determine which estimation techniques would be ideal for the 
further estimation of the gravity model. The Hausman specification test compares the fixed 
versus random effects under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with 
the other regressors in the model. If correlated and the null hypothesis is rejected, adopting a 
random effect model procedure biases the results, therefore a fixed-effects model would be 
preferable (Glick and Rose, 2001). Diagnostic tests for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity were performed in specifying and estimating the model and appropriate 
remedies were applied, where possible. The following section provides an analysis of the 
descriptive statistics of the sample. 
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5.2 Analysis of Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics for both the whole sample of available observations 
and for currency union members. The number of available observations is tabulated along with 
the mean and standard deviation. There are also statistics on minimum and maximum values of 
the respective samples. To assess non- random selection, one can also compare the means of 
the relevant variables across the groups of country pairs with and without a common currency. 
Appendix Table 4 gives a summary of the common currency areas in SADC namely, the CMA 
and Zimbabwe’s multicurrency regime that includes the Rand and the Pula. Appendix Table 11 
is a summary of the data statistics including the observed 12 common currency pairs in the 
SADC region. This common currency pair subgroup makes up 11.4% of 105 country pairs in 
SADC. Table 3 indicates that members of currency unions tended to be smaller and 
geographically closer than non-currency union members.; they more often share a language, 
borders and a regional trade area. SADC common currency areas are associated with higher 
incomes relative to the whole sample as shown by the slightly higher mean of the product of 
real GDPs of country pairs. However, the respective mean values for product of the real GDP 
per capita indicate that members of common currency areas have a higher standard of living 
than the rest of the sample. This indicates that, in all these respects, country pairs that do and 
do not use the same currency do form distinct groups. It is also interesting to note that common 
currency-pairs have significantly higher mean bilateral trade which supports the hypothesis of 
currency unions increases the trade flows between a trading pair.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics                       
Variable Whole Sample 
 
Common Currency Pairs 
  Obs Mean S.D Min Max   Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
Average Bilateral Trade 1890 116.2 366.3 0 2919 
 
198 402.7 683.5 0 2919 
Product of Real GDP 1890 805.3 3170 0.514 45822 
 
198 924.4 1966 1.11 10288 
Product of Real GDP/Capita 1890 9.27 18.72 0.023 163.5 
 
198 7.27 8.7 0.21 44.68 
Product of Land Mass Area 105 400 604.1 0.001 2923 
 
12 195.2 312.4 0.53 1005 
Distance 105 2103 1135 152.5 4910 
 
12 988.2 438 299.2 1590 
Regional Trade Agreement 1890 0.926 0.261 0 1 
 
198 1 0 1 1 
Common Language 105 0.619 0.487 0 1 
 
12 1 0 1 1 
Common Land Border 105 0.231 0.423 0 1 
 
12 0.455 0.522 0 1 
Landlocked 105 0.644 0.481 0 1   12 0.909 0.302 0 1 
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Figure 3 shows the average bilateral trade flows between 105 SADC member state country-
pairs for the years 2000 to 2017. It is immediately evident that South Africa’s bilateral trade 
flows with other SADC member countries are higher as compared to other country-pairs. The 
highest ranking average bilateral trade flows for the period under observation being between 
South Africa and the other common currency member countries except for Angola and 
Botswana. This shows that the domestic currency peg to the Rand of the CMA countries has 
had a positive impact on the trade volumes between South Africa and these countries. 
Figure 3. Average Bilateral Trade Flows 
 
 
5.3 Tests of the Model 
5.3.1 Pooled, Fixed and Random Effects Estimations – The Hausman Test 
In estimating the gravity model as prescribed by Glick and Rose (2001), unbalanced panel data 
have been used which include individual effects in the regression. It followed that a decision 
had to be made on whether these individual effects are treated as fixed or random. A core 
assumption in random effects estimation is that the random effects are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables (Olsson, 2013). The Hausman test was employed to test this assumption 
through a comparison of the fixed and random effects estimation of the coefficients. For the 
Hausman test to be conducted, first a random effects panel regression is estimated (results are 
presented in Table 4 below). The test indicates whether the specific effects are correlated or not 
with the explanatory variables. According to Adefemi (2017) the specifications for the 
determination of the right model between the fixed and random effects model are as follows; 
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Hypothesis:  
 
Null hypothesis(H0) = Random effects model is appropriate 
Alternative hypothesis(H1) = Fixed effects model is appropriate 
 
Decision Criterion: Reject H0 if probability value is less than 5%, fail to reject the H0 if 
probability value is greater than 5%.   
 
The results of the Hausman test statistics as shown in Table 4 suggest that the Fixed Effects 
Model (FEM) is preferred over the Random Effects Model (REM) because of the high Chi-
squared statistic value and a low p-value which supports the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the REM is appropriate. In following Rose (2000), the conventional OLS method is 
preferred over the FEM. The estimated results of the average bilateral trade between the SADC 
member states country-pairs using equation (4) are given in Table 4. The first column shows 
the results for the FEM. Results from REM and pooled OLS estimation are reported in column 
2 and 3 respectively. The gravity model works well in a number of different dimensions. The 
model fits the data well, explaining over half of the variation in bilateral trade flows for both 
the FEM and the REM. Few of the effects vary much over time, so using OLS simply improves 
the precision of the coefficient estimates. The gravity coefficients are mostly economically and 
statistically significant with sensible interpretations except for the coefficients for the Currency 
Union, Landlocked and the Log Product Real GDP per Capita variables. For instance, 
economically larger and richer countries trade more and more distant countries and landlocked 
countries trade less. A common language, land border and membership in a regional trade 
agreement encourage trade. The currency union coefficient is not intuitively signed and is also 
not statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 
Table 4. OLS, Random and Fixed Effect Panel Regression Estimation 
  Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS (Pooled) 
Currency Union                                                                         -0.337877 -0.573281** -0.342254 
 (0.21227) (0.238187) (0.212871) 
Common Language 0.835560*** 1.065243** 0.900926*** 
 
(0.132508) (0.474261) (0.13247) 
Landlocked -0.024302 -0.620184 -0.172218 
 
(0.135501) (0.459393) (0.13247) 
Common Land Border 1.771590*** 1.771838*** 1.812496*** 
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(0.165902) (0.621949) (0.166356) 
RTA 0.418979* 0.117529 0.408918* 
 
(0.226951) (0.144635) (0.219823) 
Log Product Real GDP 1.159118*** 0.467443*** 1.036528*** 
 
(0.051118) (0.070449) (0.045613) 
Log Product Real GDP/Capita 0.042669 0.381479*** 0.020116 
 
(0.044035) (0.086249) (0.043816) 
Log Distance -1.680351*** -1.991845*** -1.674521*** 
 
(0.102568) (0.368911) (0.102964) 
Log Product Area -0.250228*** 0.104859 -0.212361*** 
  (0.03113) (0.084891) (0.030412) 
Observations                                              
R2  
1786 
0.566784 
1786 
0.316867 
1786 
0.558851 
Hausman Test (Chi.Sq Statistic)              
Hausman Test (p-value)   
18.339215 
0.0011   
Note: Dependent variable Xijt represents average bilateral trade flows between country i and j. 
          Annual data for 15 countries from 2000 to 2017 constituting 105 country-pairs. 
          Standard errors in parentheses, *,**,*** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
5.3.2 Test for Multicollinearity 
According to Tri Do (2006) multicollinearity occurs when independent variables in a regression 
model are correlated. When independent variables are correlated it indicates that changes in 
one variable are associated with shifts in another. To check for the presence of multicollinearity 
in the model, the correlation matrix (Appendix Table 1) has been used to assess the level of 
correlation between the explanatory variables. Most of the values of the correlation coefficients 
between explanatory variables are lower than 0.50, an indication of the absence of severe 
multicollinearity except for GDP and Bilateral Trade which are correlated (r= 0.519). To 
validate the results of the correlation matrix, the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variable 
were assessed and presented in Appendix Table 2. The VIF for Log (product of real GDP) and 
Log (product of real GDP per Capita) are large at 2.768130 and 2.204603 respectively. To 
correct for multicollinearity, I removed the violating variable in this case Log (product of real 
GDP) was removed from the model. Appendix Table 2 shows the resulting VIFs after removing 
GDP and these are satisfactory as all of them are between 1 and 2. 
 
5.3.3 Test for Heteroscedasticity 
In conducting the panel data analysis for the bilateral trade model an underlying assumption of 
regression analysis is homoscedasticity. This means that the variances of error are homogenous 
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and that the errors of the model are identically distributed. If this assumption is violated, then 
the variance of errors or the model is not the same for all observations and any estimation of 
their variance becomes unreliable. To test for heteroscedasticity (which is the absence of 
homoscedasticity), first scatter graphs of the residuals squared plotted against the explanatory 
variables were assessed. An evident pattern with all the scatter plots indicated that 
heteroscedasticity was present (Appendix Figure 1). To further confirm the presence of 
heteroscedasticity the histogram normality test (Appendix Figure 2) was utilised and the 
resulting Jarque-Bera statistic and the p-value of zero indicated that the model’s residual errors 
were not normally distributed. This therefore means the model violated the assumption of 
homoscedasticity. To remedy the heteroscedasticity, the standard errors were white cross-
section adjusted for the estimation of the pooled OLS regression. This technique effectively 
improves the estimation of the standard errors and estimators without changing the estimate of 
the slope coefficients as shown by the results in column 1 of Table 5 below. 
 
5.3.4 Test for Autocorrelation 
The term autocorrelation can be defined as correlation between members of observations in 
time-series data or cross-sectional data. The absence of autocorrelation in disturbances ui can 
be expressed as; 
 
E(ui,uj) = 0 i ≠ j 
 
That is, the disturbance term relating to an observation is not related to or influenced by the 
disturbance term of any other observation. The consequences of autocorrelation are that the 
estimated variances of OLS estimators will be biased. This gives the appearance that a 
coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero, whereas in fact that might not be the 
case. The Durbin- Watson d statistic is widely used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in 
regression models. If a computed d value is closer to zero, there is evidence of positive 
autocorrelation, but if closer to 4 there is evidence of negative autocorrelation. The desired d 
value is one which is closer to 2 as this favour the absence of autocorrelation (Gujarati & Porter, 
2009). The pooled OLS regression analysis of the gravity model results in a d statistic of 
0.208511 which indicates the presence of positive serial correlation in the residuals. To remedy 
the autocorrelation, the regression equation was transformed to a generalized difference 
equation of the first order AR (1) first-order serial correlation which resulted in a computed d 
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value of 2.248399 which means serial correlation has been remedied as shown in column 2 of 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5. White Corrected and First Order Autoregression Estimations 
  
White's Corrected 
Regression 
Estimation 
White's Corrected First-
Order Auto regression 
Estimation 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
C 11.03996*** 13.43855*** 
 
(0.299817) (2.926259) 
Currency Union                                                                         -0.315411** 0.437614 
 
(0.146550) (0.294597) 
Common Language 0.913222*** 0.653205 
 
(0.065179) (0.63983) 
Landlocked -0.937272*** -1.125715** 
 
(0.071305) (0.559738) 
Common Land Border 1.909259*** 1.997900* 
 
(0.063162) (0.485936) 
RTA 0.798477*** -0.340131*** 
 
(0.156671) (0.171067) 
Log Product Real GDP/Capita 0.604425*** 0.347122*** 
 
(0.040023) (0.117974) 
Log Distance -1.693062*** -1.658037*** 
 
(0.046186) (0.382675) 
Log Product Area 0.284681*** 0.173485*** 
 
(0.013668) (0.076408) 
AR (1)  0.883803*** 
    (0.013426) 
Observations 1786 1663 
R-squared 0.431211 0.886003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.428651 0.885382 
F-statistic 168.3978 1427.485 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.208511 2.521604 
Notes: Dependent variable Xijt represents average bilateral trade flows between country i and j. 
          Annual data for 15 countries from 2000 to 2017 constituting 105 country-pairs. 
          Standard errors in parentheses, *,**,*** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
          Column 1 represents the White’s corrected regression estimation after dropping the Log Product Real GDP. 
         Column 2 represents the White’s corrected, first order autoregression estimation after dropping the Log Product Real GDP. 
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5.4 Results 
Since multicollinearity was found among the explanatory variables, the model in equation (4) 
is estimated taking all variables except for the Log Product Real GDP variable for all 105 
country-pairs over the 18 years under study. The estimation uses White’s heteroscedasticity-
corrected covariance matrix estimator, which is considered to be a robust method. This focuses 
on improving the estimation of the standard errors without changing the estimates of the slope 
coefficients. Table 5 (column 1) reports the White’s heteroscedasticity corrected model 
regression result after removing the Log Product Real GDP variable to correct for 
multicollinearity. The estimation results presented in column 1 of Table 5 show that all the 
coefficients are economically and statistically significant. The currency union dummy variable 
has an unexpected sign indicating that participation in a currency union has the effect of 
reducing trade between a trading pair by a factor of -0.315. The reported R-squared and F-
statistics of the regression output however, imply that the entire model explains only 43% of 
the variations in the trade flow. The R-square is 0.431 and F-statistics is highly significant with 
p = 0.00. 
 
The estimation results of bilateral trade between the member countries of the SADC are given 
in Table 5 (column 2). The results shown are corrected for multicollinearity by dropping the 
Log Product Real GDP variable, autocorrected by doing AR (1) differencing and are White’s 
heteroscedasticity corrected pooled OLS which is suggested by Khan and Hossain (2010). All 
the estimated coefficients have all the expected signs theoretically. It is expected that the effect 
of distance which is a proxy for transportation costs, between two trading countries on trade 
balances is negative. The further apart the two trading countries are the less the expected trade 
balances. The product for GDP per capita in time t is used as a measure of market size, the 
larger the market the more it trades so therefore market size is expected to have a positive 
relationship with trade. Three of the five dummy variables namely the currency union dummy 
variable, the common language dummy variable and the shared land border dummy variable 
are all expected to have a positive relationship with trade. This is because these shared attributes 
improve relations between two trading countries and hence by extension are expected to 
encourage trade. The currency union dummy variable has a positive sign as expected, indicating 
that participation in a currency union has the effect of reducing trade between a trading pair 
although the coefficient is not statistically significant. The reported R-squared and F-statistics 
of the regression output however, imply that the entire model explains approximately 87% of 
the variations in the trade flow. The R-square is 0.886 and F-statistics is highly significant with 
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p = 0. 00. The product of the country mass areas of the trading pair is expected to be positively 
related to trade because the larger the area covered by a country the higher the population and 
the expected propensity to trade. Lastly the landlocked dummy variable and the regional trade 
agreement dummy variable are expected to have a negative sign. Appendix Figure 3 is a graphic 
representation of the relationships between the respective explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable and the graphs support the expected theoretical relationship between the 
dependent variable and the respective explanatory variables. 
 
5.5 Regression Model Sensitivity Analysis 
In their paper critiquing the available literature on currency union trade effects, Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2007) identified what they termed “the silver medal mistake” in estimating gravity 
models. Most gravity model estimations, according to Baldwin and Taglioni (2007), make the 
mistake of using the arithmetic mean of uni-directional bilateral trade flows instead of using 
geometric mean and by so doing mistake the log of the average for the average of the logs8. 
This mistake tends to produce biased results. As posited by Anderson (2011) another challenge 
when estimating regression models is the presence of zero trade observation between trading 
country pairs that might be an indication of no trade between the countries. Zero trade flows 
occur between small or distant trading partners which are theoretically expected to trade 
minimally. This presents a challenge when specifying a log-linear gravity model. Taking 
logarithms effectively drops zero trade observations from the sample because the log of zero is 
undefined. Dropping zero observations, however, can lead to biased estimates of the 
coefficients (Olsson, 2013).  
 
Three main approaches traditionally are used to address the zero-trade flow problem, and these 
include the Ad hoc solutions, the Poisson model and the Heckman’s sample selection model. 
Alternatively, under the Ad hoc solution, zero values may be substituted by a small constant so 
that the log-linear model can be estimated without dropping zero trade country-pairs from the 
sample.  Earlier studies by Raballand (2003) and Wang and Winters (1991) had similar 
problems which were addressed by modifying the model specification by replacing all zero-
trade flow with a minimum value of one given that the log of one is defined as zero and therefore 
                                                 
8 The arithmetic mean is calculated by adding up all the numbers in a data set and dividing the results by the total 
number of data points whereas the geometric mean of a data set is calculated by multiplying the numbers in the 
data set and taking the nth root of the result, where “n” is the total number of data points in the set. 
 45 
 
all relevant observations are included in the sample. This was considered by Martin and Pham 
(2008) to be a more plausible approach than dropping some observations all together. 
 
In Table 6, I provided some sensitivity analysis. I perturbed my basic methodology in a number 
of different ways, and tabulate estimates of the coefficients of the explanatory variables using 
OLS estimators. Table 6 shows the results for four variations of the basic gravity equation using 
the full sample of SADC member countries. Column 1 shows the estimates when the arithmetic 
mean is used to calculate the average bilateral flows between a country-pair and utilises zeros 
to represent instances where trade statistics between country-pairs are not available. Column 2 
also utilises the arithmetic mean method to calculate average bilateral trade flow between 
trading partners but unlike the specifications in column 1, zero trade statistics are substituted 
with a value of one. Column 3 and 4 use the geometric mean method (which tends to produce 
higher coefficients parameters) to calculate average bilateral trade flows with column 3 utilising 
ones to represent no trade statistics and column 4 utilising zeros instead. To determine the 
specification which yielded the least biased and most robust set of results, the resulting 
estimations of each specification were analysed. The selection is based on which specification 
produced the expected signs for all the variables, resulted in significant p-values for the 
regression coefficients and produced the highest R2 statistic also known as the coefficient of 
determination which is a goodness-of-fit measure.  
 
The estimations for the 4 specifications show that the intercept coefficient for the specifications 
using values of one for zero trade flows, that is specifications (1) and (3), were significantly 
higher than the specifications retaining zeros for zero trade flows. Most of the signs of the 
explanatory variables are as expected except for the estimations for specification (1) and (2) 
using the arithmetic mean to calculate average bilateral trade. The sign for the currency union 
dummy variable coefficients under these specifications were found to be negative which 
contradicts the theoretical expectation. All four specifications result in statistically insignificant 
currency union dummy variable coefficients. This further validates that the data provides little 
or no evidence that the null hypothesis is false. Specification (1) and (2) also exhibited fewer 
significant variables as compared to specification (3) and (4) which each have eight out of ten 
coefficients being statistically significant. An interesting outcome of the regression estimations 
is the sign for the regional trade agreement dummy variable generated under specifications (3) 
and (4) which seems to indicate that membership in SADC tends to have a negative impact on 
average bilateral trade flows between two trading countries. Overall, the coefficient of 
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determination statistic is highest for specification (4) relative to the other specifications which 
means that approximately 88.9% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained 
collectively by the explanatory variables. Given the above factors specification (4) embodies 
the most robust and least biased regression estimation for equation (4). 
 
   Table 6. Summary of variable coefficients and p-values 
 
  Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) Specification (4) 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
C 20.36417*** 8.685841** 20.66073*** 13.43855*** 
 
(4.973126) (4.139918) (3.062659) (2.926259) 
Currency Union                                                                         -0.424984 -0.31053 0.164412 0.437614 
 
(0.384802) (0.276735) (0.398028) (0.294597) 
Common Language 1.973571*** 0.642291 1.14436 0.653205 
 
(0.744857) (0.830262) (0.762303) (0.639830) 
Landlocked -2.369554*** -1.189506* -1.141872* -1.125715** 
 
(0.865656) (0.628287) (0.669339) (0.559738) 
Common Land Border 2.243246** 2.362069*** 1.790331*** 1.997900*** 
 
(0.943744) (0.723010) (0.580815) (0.485936) 
RTA 0.163622 0.151386 -0.383083*** -0.340131** 
 
(0.582586) (0.179113) (0.079347) (0.171067) 
Log Product Real GDP/Capita 0.660932 0.375023*** 0.544574*** 0.347122*** 
 
(0.423656) (0.103493) (0.137188) (0.117974) 
Log Distance -3.245593*** -1.143268*** -2.893825*** -1.658037*** 
 
(0.685966) (0.505788) (0.436495) (0.382675) 
Log Product Area 0.543893*** 0.243702*** 0.345700*** 0.173485*** 
 
(0.14542) (0.088959) (0.114651) (0.076408) 
AR (1) 0.862196*** 0.887939*** 0.855751*** 0.883803*** 
  (0.025927) (0.028452) (0.021163) (0.013426) 
Observations 1785 1058 1785 1663 
R-squared 0.851035 0.869968 0.847493 0.886003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.850279 0.86885 0.846719 0.885382 
F-statistic 1126.094 778.3175 1095.36 1427.485 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.471833 2.104052 2.418143 2.521604 
Notes: Annual data for 15 countries for the period 2000 to 2017, 105 country pairs represented.  
Dependent variable Xijt represents average bilateral trade flows between country i and j. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
Specification (1) Substitutes zero trade values with 1 and the arithmetic mean is used to calculate average bilateral trade. 
Specification (2) Retains zero trade flow values and the arithmetic mean is used to calculate average bilateral trade. 
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Specification (3) Substitutes zero trade values with 1 and the geometric mean is used to calculate average bilateral trade. 
Specification (4) Retains zero trade flow values, and the geometric mean is used to calculate average bilateral trade. 
   
 
5.6 Discussion 
The lack of statistical significance of the common currency dummy variable as reported in 
Table 6 specification (4), is highly likely due to the presence of a high number of zero trade 
values between trading partners in the currency union sample. These zero trade values are 
motivated by the small market sizes that are characteristic of most African countries and the 
lack of capacity to produce enough for the export market. As highlighted by Jefferis (2007) 
with a few exceptions, intraregional trade is relatively unimportant as a proportion of most 
REC’s total exports. SADC member country exports to other countries within the region 
constitute about 10 percent of the region’s total exports. This number is very low when 
compared to intra-European Union trade, for instance, which amounts to over 50 percent of EU 
exports. Another major drawback to regional integration (RI) in Africa is that it tends to benefit 
the stronger members only and as a result even a common currency would not have the expected 
positive impact on trade flows. This argument as discussed by (Alves, Draper, and Khumalo, 
2009) holds that when a cluster of countries in an RI arrangement contains economies 
performing well above the global average the forces of convergence will prevail. In other 
words, the weaker members will ‘catch up’ as resources flow from their countries to the 
economically stronger countries. But when a group contains no globally strong economies, 
resources will flow from the weakest in the group to the strongest, where it is relatively cheaper 
and easier to do business, and where there are better-developed connections to global export 
markets. On the other hand, when a group contains no globally strong economies, the relatively 
stronger economies will grow at the expense of the weaker members in the RI arrangement. 
The latter situation is consistent with SADC which has South Africa as the stronger economy 
among all the member states and hence the country records significant exports to these other 
weaker member economies relative to exports between other member countries.    
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The empirical results of Rose (2000) and other authors that membership in a currency union 
might increase trade by a factor of two or more have been used to promote the creation of new 
currency unions, following the example of the Eurozone. Given the small size of Africa’s trade, 
the formation of currency unions seems a logical way to boost trade and to improve monetary 
policy. The main purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the potential impact of a 
hypothetical currency union for all SADC member countries on the level of trade between the 
15-member states. In this respect a gravity model was estimated with panel data using pooled 
OLS, random and fixed effect estimations covering the 18-year period 2000 to 2017. In general, 
within these three formulations of gravity models, the estimation with pooled OLS effects 
performed better than both the REM and the FEM, since the estimation results in pooled OLS 
effects provided a more satisfactory outcome of the estimated economic factors based on the 
theoretical expectations. The variable of interest that is the currency union dummy, however, 
was found to not be statistically significantly different from zero holding all other variables 
constant. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that a currency union for SADC members 
will result in increased bilateral trade flows in the region.  Other results indicate that the bilateral 
trade volume between the SADC member countries are driven by country land mass area, 
economic size and shared land borders. Distance, landlocked status and being party to a regional 
trade agreement were found to have a negative impact on the trade volumes between member 
countries.  
 
Income differentials between SADC member states are very wide, with GDP per Capita of the 
richest SADC member being 37 times that of the poorest in the region. Within the CMA, the 
equivalent gap in GDP per Capita between the richest country Seychelles and the poorest 
Malawi is only four times. Another deterrent of the effectiveness of SADC monetary union are 
the low levels of intraregional trade. A successful regional trade agreement while beneficial, 
would not, however, be sufficient for a viable monetary union. Transformation into a full 
customs union would have to follow for the establishment of a single market for goods and 
services, capital and labour among participating countries. Regional economic communities 
will, therefore, need to facilitate free labour and capital mobility. Concerning capital movement 
controls, most SADC members now accept in principle, that the free flow of capital within 
SADC is desirable and feasible. However, free labour mobility is difficult to attain, stemming 
from concerns that severe income disparities inside the region might cause unsustainable 
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migration among countries. The issue of economic union is unlikely to be feasible, at least not 
across all SADC member countries, for the foreseeable future. One of the most contentious 
issues facing a potential monetary union pertains to the need for a transfer or reimbursement 
mechanism. This will help towards convergence among poorer and richer nations via the 
provision of resource transfers from the latter to the former. This has been an integral element 
of financial integration within the EU. It may also provide compensation for the tendency of 
economic activity to gravitate to the centre of a stronger economic area, leaving weaker 
economies with slower growth. The SACU agreement has a built-in compensation mechanism 
built into the revenue distribution, which essentially involves transfers from South Africa to 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Eswatini. But the same mechanism would be hard to achieve 
given the larger number of SADC countries, several of which might be a lot poorer than the 
poorest SACU member and have much larger populations. In addition, it is difficult to envisage 
South Africa imparting sufficiently sizeable transfers to the rest of SADC that will have a 
meaningful impact on per capita income levels. 
 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that not one factor affects the bilateral trade 
flow of a country-pair; instead there are several factors that come into play and collectively 
they affect trade. An introduction of a currency union as shown by the results has no effect on 
bilateral trade flow between member countries. The statistics in this dissertation show that trade 
will increase due to a trading pair’s country size and market size. Another factor that also affects 
the trade flow is a shared land border. A shared border indirectly reduces the costs of 
transportation and general costs of transacting between two trading countries resulting in an 
increase in bilateral trade flows. Leaving currency issues aside, African countries can do much 
to increase trade. This includes infrastructural development, reducing political tensions, and 
reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. There is much evidence that transportation costs 
are higher in Africa than the rest of the world and result from poor infrastructure and civil unrest 
(Masson, 2006). Efforts should be made to reduce these costs by eliminating customs barriers 
and investing in infrastructure to facilitate trade. 
 
The results reported in this dissertation are subject to some limitations.  One major limitation 
lies in the fact that my analysis relies on data based on currency union proxies since a SADC 
currency union does not already exist. Thus, any extrapolation from my results to infer the 
impact of an actual currency union on trade might lead to less than robust conclusions. Although 
most of the results are in line with the theoretical expectation, there are still some 
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recommendations for future studies. For example, specifying more economic variables that may 
affect the trading volume in the SADC region, including the inflation rate and the real exchange 
rate between county pairs. In addition, a longer time line that facilitates for long-run analysis 
would be helpful in deriving more accurate estimations. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix Figure 1. Residual Plots  
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Appendix Figure 2. Histogram Normality Test  
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Appendix Figure 3. Explanatory against Dependent Variable Scatter Graph Plots  
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Appendix Table 1. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2. Variance Inflation Factors 
 
 
Variance Inflation Factors with 
original variables 
 
Variance Inflation Factors after 
dropping the Real GDP variable 
  Coefficient Uncentered Centred Coefficient Uncentered Centred 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
 
Variance VIF VIF 
C  0.709762  242.3838  NA 
 
0.896861  237.2703  NA 
Currency Union                                                                          0.045060  1.318241  1.205313 
 
0.058163  1.318193  1.205268 
Common Language  0.017539  3.786156  1.392780 
 
0.022639  3.786093  1.392757 
Landlocked  0.017541  3.897461  1.361711 
 
0.021187  3.646729  1.274109 
Common Land Border  0.027631  2.277136  1.727614 
 
0.035644  2.275619  1.726464 
RTA  0.048289  15.21637  1.175733 
 
0.061955  15.12422  1.168613 
Log Product Real GDP  0.002073  18.00840  2.768130 
    
Log Product Real GDP/Capita  0.001918  2.616542  2.204603 
 
0.001625  1.717467  1.447075 
Log Distance  0.010588  200.9851  1.717595 
 
0.013666  200.9731  1.717492 
Log Product Area  0.000924  7.662593  3.532731   0.000577  3.706399  1.708783 
 
 
  
  
Bilateral 
Trade 
CU 
Dummy 
Common 
Language Landlocked 
Land 
Border RTA GDP  GDP/Capita Distance 
CU Dummy 0.287682                 
Common Language 0.07349 0.2328194               
Landlocked -0.03547 0.1458329 0.2013563             
Land Border 0.354643 0.1710537 0.1467841 0.1166585           
RTA 0.081624 0.08362 0.2339426 0.1698049 0.15336542         
GDP  0.504108 0.0241767 -0.087848 -0.1964719 0.0256857 0.0489284       
GDP/Capita 0.154909 -0.003925 0.2155063 -0.1186083 -0.0870331 0.1233492 0.0854951     
Distance -0.271083 -0.305258 -0.093152 -0.3866948 -0.4931914 -0.033117 -0.01912 0.2447815   
Area 0.216102 -0.1031 -0.242252 -0.3744869 0.27356283 0.0244829 0.324178 -0.174006 -0.051486 
 59 
 
Appendix Table 3. Definition of Variables  
 
Variable Name   Definition 
Dependent Variable 
  
Log(Average Bilateral Trade) Ln(Xijt) The logarithm of the average value of real bilateral trade between i and j at time t 
        
Explanatory Variables 
       
Log(Product of Real GDP) Ln(YiYj)t The logarithm of the product of the real GDPs of i and j at time t 
Log(Product of Real 
GDP/Capita) Ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)t The logarithm of the product of the real GDPs per Capita of i and j at time t 
Log(Product of Land Area) Ln(AreaiAreaj) The logarithm of the product of the land mass area of i and j 
Log(Distance) Ln(Dij) The logarithm of the distance between i and j 
        
Dummy Variables 
       
Currency Union CUij Is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a common currency 
Common Language Langij Is a binary variable which is unity if iand j share a language 
Landlocked Landlij Is a binary variable which is unity if either i or j is landlocked 
Common Land Border ComLij Is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border 
Regional Trade Agreement RTAijt 
Is a binary variable which is unity if i and j where both members of SADC at time 
t 
 
 
Appendix Table 4. Common Currency Country-pairs  
Currency Union Areas   
    
South Africa 
  
Namibia 
   
Lesotho 
   
Eswatini 
  
    
Zimbabwe 
  
Botswana 
  
South Africa     
Note: Namibia, Lesotho and Eswatini have pegged their respective currencies at 1:1 to the South African rand under the CMA agreement. 
Zimbabwe adopted a multicurrency regime in 2009 that includes the rand and the pula which are used as legal tender in the country. 
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Appendix Table 5. Included Variables   
 
Variable Source Unit of Measurement 
Bilateral Trade Flow 
International Monetary 
Fund  
US $ 
GDP World Bank US $ 
GDP per Capita World Bank US $ 
Area CIA World Factbook  Kilometres Squared 
Common Border CIA World Factbook  Binominal (0/1) 
Common Language CIA World Factbook  Binominal (0/1) 
Landlocked CIA World Factbook  Binominal (0/1) 
RTA World Trade Organisation Binominal (0/1) 
Bilateral Distance www.indo.com/distance Kilometres 
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Appendix Table 6. Included Countries and their border countries and land area 
 
Country  
Country 
Code 
Border Countries 
Area 
Km2 
Angola a Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo Namibia, Zambia  1246700 
Botswana b Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe 581730 
DRC. c 
Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, 
South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
2344858 
Lesotho d South Africa 30355 
Malawi e  Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia  118484 
Mauritius f Island 2040 
Mozambique g Malawi, South Africa, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 799380 
Namibia h Angola, Botswana, South Africa, Zambia  824292 
Seychelles i Island 455 
South Africa j Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Eswatini, Zimbabwe 1219090 
Eswatini k Mozambique, South Africa 17364 
Tanzania l 
Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia  
947300 
Zambia m 
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe 
752618 
Zimbabwe n Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia 390757 
Madagascar o Island 582295 
Source: World Factbook (2018) 
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Appendix Table 7. Included Countries and their languages 
 
Country  Languages 
Angola 
Portuguese, Umbundu, Kikongo, Kimbundu, Chokwe, Nhaneca, Nganguela, 
Fiote, Kwanhama, Muhumbi and Luvale  
Botswana 
Setswana, Sekalanga, Shekgalagadi, English, Zezuru/Shona, Sesarwa, 
Sembukushu and Ndebele  
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
French, Lingala, Kingwana (a dialect of Kiswahili or Swahili), Kikongo 
andTshiluba 
Lesotho Sesotho (official) (southern Sotho), English (official), Zulu, Xhosa 
Malawi 
English, Chichewa, Chinyanja, Chiyao, Chitumbuka, Chilomwe, Chinkhonde, 
Chingoni, Chisena, Chitonga, Chinyakyusa and Chilambya 
Mauritius Creole, Bhojpuri, French and English,  
Mozambique Emakhuwa, Portuguese, Xichangana, Cisena, Elomwe and Echuwabo,  
Namibia 
Oshivambo, Nama/Damara, Afrikaans, Otjiherero languages, Kavango 
languages, Caprivi languages and English 
Seychelles Seychellois Creole, English and French  
South Africa 
isiZulu, isiXhosa, Afrikaans, English, Sepedi, Setswana, Sesotho, Xitsonga, 
siSwati, Tshivenda, isiNdebele and sign language  
Eswatini English and siSwati  
Tanzania Kiswahili or Swahili, Kiunguja, English and Arabic  
Zambia 
Bembe, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi, Chewa, Nsenga, Tumbuka, Lunda, Kaonde 1.8%, 
Lala, Lamba, English, Luvale, Mambwe, Namwanga, Lenje and Bisa,  
Zimbabwe 
Shona, Ndebele, English, Chewa, Chibarwe, Kalanga, Koisan, Nambya, Ndau, 
Shangani, sign language, Sotho, Tonga, Tswana, Venda, and Xhosa 
Madagascar Malagasy and French 
Source: World Factbook (2018) 
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Appendix Table 8. Real GDP Statistics for the Period 2000-2017 (US$ Billions) 
 
 Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Average 
Angola 9.13 8.94 12.50 14.19 19.64 28.23 41.79 60.45 84.18 75.49 82.53 104.12 113.92 124.91 126.73 102.62 95.34 124.21 68.27 
Botswana 5.79 5.49 5.44 7.51 8.96 9.93 10.13 10.94 10.95 10.27 12.79 15.68 14.69 14.92 16.25 14.42 15.65 17.41 11.51 
DRC 19.09 7.44 8.73 8.94 10.30 11.96 14.45 16.74 19.79 18.65 21.57 25.84 29.31 32.67 35.92 37.92 34.99 37.24 21.75 
Lesotho 0.89 0.83 0.78 1.16 1.51 1.68 1.80 1.82 1.87 1.87 2.39 2.79 2.68 2.53 2.61 2.51 2.29 2.64 1.92 
Malawi 1.74 1.72 3.50 3.21 3.48 3.66 4.00 4.43 5.32 6.19 6.96 8.00 6.03 5.52 6.05 6.37 5.43 6.30 4.88 
Mauritius 4.58 4.54 4.77 5.61 6.39 6.28 7.03 8.15 9.99 9.13 10.00 11.52 11.67 12.13 12.80 11.69 12.23 13.34 8.99 
Mozambique 5.02 4.77 5.03 5.60 6.83 7.72 8.31 9.37 11.49 10.91 10.15 13.13 14.53 16.02 16.96 14.80 11.01 12.33 10.22 
Namibia 3.91 3.55 3.36 4.93 6.61 7.26 7.98 8.74 8.49 8.88 11.28 12.41 13.02 12.72 12.79 11.77 11.31 13.24 9.01 
Seychelles 0.61 0.62 0.70 0.71 0.84 0.92 1.02 1.03 0.97 0.85 0.97 1.07 1.06 1.33 1.34 1.38 1.43 1.49 1.02 
South Africa 136.36 121.60 115.75 175.26 228.94 257.67 271.81 299.03 287.10 297.22 375.30 416.88 396.33 366.83 350.90 317.74 295.76 349.42 281.11 
Eswatini 1.74 1.54 1.43 2.20 2.77 3.18 3.29 3.47 3.29 3.58 4.44 4.82 4.82 4.56 4.38 4.02 3.72 4.41 3.43 
Tanzania 10.19 10.38 10.81 11.66 12.83 16.93 18.61 21.50 27.37 28.57 31.41 33.88 39.09 44.41 48.22 45.62 47.39 52.09 28.39 
Zambia 6.69 6.78 6.34 5.73 5.81 5.76 5.44 5.29 4.42 8.62 10.14 12.10 14.24 15.45 15.89 16.30 16.62 17.85 9.97 
Zimbabwe 3.60 4.09 4.19 4.90 6.22 8.33 12.76 14.06 17.91 15.33 20.27 23.46 25.50 28.05 27.15 21.15 20.95 25.81 15.76 
Madagascar 3.88 4.53 4.40 5.47 4.36 5.04 5.52 7.34 9.41 8.55 8.73 9.89 9.92 10.60 10.67 9.74 10.00 11.50 7.75 
 
Source: “World Development Indicator” World Bank (2018) 
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Appendix Table 9. Real GDP per Capita Statistics for the Period 2000-2017 (US$) 
 
 Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Average 
Angola 555.30 526.17 711.18 779.47 1041.09 1443.99 2062.42 2878.84 3868.58 3347.84 3531.42 4299.01 4539.47 4804.63 4707.58 3683.55 3308.77 4170.31 2792.20 
Botswana 3349.07 3128.10 3055.62 4163.07 4896.58 5351.25 5374.55 5714.05 5623.38 5185.73 6346.16 7645.21 7029.23 7007.63 7493.76 6527.51 6954.17 7595.60 5691.15 
DRC 405.47 153.70 175.14 173.92 194.17 218.52 255.59 286.51 327.77 298.81 334.23 387.32 424.86 458.13 487.20 497.63 444.41 457.85 332.29 
Lesotho 474.82 437.82 407.81 603.64 781.51 862.95 915.78 918.54 935.39 924.11 1169.27 1350.68 1281.62 1193.00 1218.47 1152.32 1039.70 1181.81 936.07 
Malawi 153.26 146.76 290.98 260.11 274.23 280.37 297.70 320.22 372.84 420.74 458.87 512.13 374.50 332.92 354.73 362.66 300.31 338.48 325.10 
Mauritius 3861.03 3792.18 3957.51 4623.35 5229.88 5116.05 5695.97 6574.65 8030.06 7318.13 8000.38 9197.03 9291.23 9637.00 10153.94 9260.45 9681.62 10547.22 7220.43 
Mozambique 277.65 256.44 262.88 283.89 336.33 369.15 385.76 422.15 503.13 463.85 419.23 526.53 566.05 605.99 623.29 528.31 382.07 415.72 423.80 
Namibia 2058.00 1834.29 1713.05 2482.37 3288.26 3573.15 3881.21 4202.51 4029.07 4153.50 5191.58 5600.97 5749.40 5490.04 5392.71 4852.09 4560.70 5227.18 4071.12 
Seychelles 7578.85 7663.14 8331.26 8524.96 10176.66 11092.51 12014.40 12154.83 11122.86 9706.96 10804.68 12189.10 11998.45 14764.94 14700.22 14725.10 15060.99 15504.46 11561.91 
South Africa 2982.00 2621.55 2461.36 3678.10 4745.07 5277.93 5506.20 5994.20 5695.06 5831.12 7275.38 7976.47 7478.23 6822.52 6433.94 5746.68 5280.02 6160.73 5442.59 
Eswatini 1637.45 1437.63 1325.00 2020.99 2529.63 2873.86 2937.36 3047.49 2842.44 3032.52 3690.24 3934.27 3864.76 3587.00 3379.90 3047.95 2770.20 3224.39 2843.50 
Tanzania 306.72 304.34 308.06 323.07 345.19 442.25 471.53 528.06 651.26 658.76 701.60 733.41 820.16 901.73 950.37 872.30 877.51 936.33 618.48 
Zambia 341.91 378.27 377.13 429.16 530.28 691.32 1030.15 1104.59 1369.07 1139.11 1463.21 1644.62 1734.93 1850.79 1738.09 1313.89 1262.99 1509.80 1106.07 
Zimbabwe 547.36 548.06 507.35 453.35 454.36 444.76 414.80 397.00 325.68 624.27 719.98 840.95 968.16 1026.39 1031.10 1033.42 1029.08 1079.61 691.43 
Madagascar 245.94 278.56 262.29 316.80 245.12 274.82 292.15 377.85 470.73 415.69 412.73 454.96 443.91 461.72 452.46 402.09 401.74 449.72 369.96 
 
Source: “World Development Indicator” World Bank (2018) 
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Appendix Table 10. Average Bilateral Trade Statistics for the period 2000-2017 (US$ Millions) 
 
Country 
Pair 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Angola-
Botswana 
0.50 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.70 2.25 0.58 1.22 0.48 0.24 0.66 0.27 0.64 0.66 0.87 0.78 0.42 
Angola-DRC 0.59 0.56 0.66 0.93 1.10 1.79 2.81 3.91 1.42 0.67 1.25 1.23 1.10 2.88 7.58 3.50 2.37 2.70 
Angola-
Lesotho 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Angola-
Malawi 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Angola-
Mauritius 
6.78 6.81 6.94 7.35 7.68 8.12 10.31 1.70 0.39 2.62 1.23 0.36 0.30 0.26 1.09 0.54 0.37 0.27 
Angola-
Mozambique 
0.20 0.21 0.09 0.36 0.30 0.35 0.64 1.39 6.37 7.56 1.82 9.09 9.39 3.13 2.41 2.43 1.63 2.11 
Angola-
Namibia 
26.81 23.56 51.53 87.30 68.32 58.95 65.05 88.63 224.93 374.73 164.22 172.55 212.81 174.53 169.35 81.46 43.46 37.56 
Angola-
Seychelles 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.10 0.33 0.14 0.09 0.10 
Angola-
South Africa 
135.7 56.1 125.6 171.2 245.7 393.6 488.6 1343.9 2111.4 1262.3 1340.0 1321.2 2117.3 1515.2 1609.8 1093.7 976.1 1005.8 
Angola-
Eswatini 
2.23 0.84 0.96 1.47 1.59 2.37 4.11 5.69 6.13 8.51 1.47 3.73 10.50 3.68 0.31 2.69 1.98 2.15 
Angola-
Tanzania 
0.13 0.17 0.40 0.17 0.26 0.47 0.91 0.72 0.51 0.48 2.64 8.17 1.56 7.61 2.76 0.99 1.18 0.57 
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Angola-
Zambia 
0.16 0.07 0.15 0.38 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.42 0.62 1.05 1.21 9.15 2.63 3.50 1.55 1.02 0.99 
Angola-
Zimbabwe 
1.13 0.26 0.92 0.71 0.97 0.27 0.11 0.48 0.71 0.94 1.21 2.55 0.68 0.29 0.15 0.51 0.34 0.27 
Angola-
Madagascar 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.07 2.24 0.72 0.23 0.08 0.03 0.04 
Botswana-
DRC 
0.25 0.69 3.07 0.52 0.19 0.99 1.96 1.21 6.35 6.16 9.93 9.67 3.49 2.70 1.95 1.83 1.01 0.60 
Botswana-
Lesotho 
0.64 0.62 0.26 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.30 0.12 1.00 3.26 4.07 3.04 1.77 0.81 1.04 0.94 
Botswana-
Malawi 
2.20 1.22 1.65 1.31 1.68 1.21 1.31 1.48 2.63 3.15 3.36 13.21 4.04 5.77 4.19 3.26 4.08 4.78 
Botswana-
Mauritius 
0.52 0.37 0.86 1.68 1.10 2.81 1.48 0.74 1.74 2.05 1.15 1.10 1.31 6.06 2.28 1.23 0.88 0.28 
Botswana-
Mozambique 
0.24 0.09 0.29 1.29 1.06 0.68 2.84 1.28 2.83 3.20 3.05 11.35 7.81 2.74 5.34 12.66 36.23 20.76 
Botswana-
Namibia 
5.68 3.91 5.97 5.99 9.28 11.33 13.53 16.09 31.73 29.71 35.87 40.86 260.77 438.46 674.94 770.52 655.5 402.39 
Botswana-
Seychelles 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 1.06 
Botswana-
South Africa 
428 392 736 912 754 762 727 962 1234 1026 2303 2624 2824 2715 2788 2511 2273 2076 
Botswana-
Eswatini 
0.15 0.65 1.00 1.20 0.34 2.07 4.50 4.00 3.81 4.33 5.47 5.29 5.55 5.15 4.48 5.72 6.46 7.02 
Botswana-
Tanzania 
0.87 0.75 0.51 0.48 0.56 1.56 0.53 0.76 0.84 1.90 1.54 2.67 4.01 0.78 3.70 0.53 0.84 0.22 
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Botswana-
Zambia 
5.66 4.86 10.20 3.74 4.79 17.63 11.97 16.07 22.49 26.24 25.82 41.79 40.65 30.67 36.62 33.58 24.01 23.75 
Botswana-
Zimbabwe 
78.24 42.34 57.43 49.50 77.98 90.78 133.75 179.72 132.30 82.84 88.32 94.57 80.71 81.59 68.68 58.09 52.82 50.33 
Botswana-
Madagascar 
0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.40 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.07 
DRC-
Lesotho 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DRC-Malawi 0.01 0.02 0.40 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.04 3.63 2.31 0.48 1.48 0.24 4.18 0.73 1.06 1.24 1.44 
DRC-
Mauritius 
0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 
DRC-
Mozambique 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.39 1.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DRC-
Namibia 
0.08 2.14 0.03 1.62 5.28 6.09 23.56 22.21 32.38 35.78 36.09 48.30 52.12 86.47 160.28 135.83 52.68 60.81 
DRC-
Seychelles 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DRC-South 
Africa 
65.61 60.10 79.71 85.80 109.85 138.36 191.00 324.06 579.76 300.26 445.08 567.59 764.15 709.92 646.51 576.91 459.6 503.64 
DRC-
Eswatini 
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.00 
DRC-
Tanzania 
4.60 4.51 8.34 6.80 21.87 32.41 30.18 43.48 76.54 44.62 80.93 66.17 96.93 122.40 145.37 102.42 150.4 105.08 
DRC-Zambia 0.00 16.93 16.18 24.78 61.35 63.85 81.00 188.64 406.21 393.89 786.90 858.39 988.37 1532.0 1124.7 733.56 701.0 1138.89 
DRC-
Zimbabwe 
10.02 46.30 10.29 5.72 9.59 40.00 100.66 61.33 32.60 29.38 43.07 45.24 44.48 41.66 36.78 34.43 29.15 32.31 
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DRC-
Madagascar 
0.03 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.75 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.83 0.79 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.03 
Lesotho-
Malawi 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.10 0.12 0.23 0.37 0.46 0.00 0.14 0.49 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.28 
Lesotho-
Mauritius 
0.25 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.42 0.57 0.98 0.79 0.40 0.29 1.51 1.85 0.96 0.78 0.54 0.42 0.52 0.68 
Lesotho-
Mozambique 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.41 0.31 0.32 0.05 0.50 0.55 1.79 0.62 0.14 0.09 0.01 1.32 2.43 
Lesotho-
Namibia 
0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.13 0.29 0.33 0.42 0.47 0.35 0.52 0.41 0.37 0.30 0.18 0.55 
Lesotho-
Seychelles 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lesotho-
South Africa 
144.73 181.45 192.22 252.09 217.65 206.97 209.60 206.53 304.40 399.74 741.62 906.26 1010.3 911.33 872.89 794.12 776.8 808.60 
Lesotho-
Eswatini 
0.02 0.22 0.17 2.18 0.19 2.40 7.38 1.96 1.98 1.55 5.93 6.73 7.60 7.66 7.99 7.30 6.99 7.13 
Lesotho-
Tanzania 
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.25 0.22 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.09 
Lesotho-
Zambia 
0.02 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.65 0.17 1.13 0.25 0.21 0.10 0.30 2.04 4.81 5.62 4.56 3.96 4.37 4.03 
Lesotho-
Zimbabwe 
0.55 0.52 0.61 0.27 0.82 0.05 0.02 1.16 0.30 6.49 2.64 1.91 1.05 0.77 0.85 0.64 0.62 2.94 
Lesotho-
Madagascar 
0.00 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.90 1.39 1.35 2.22 2.49 2.25 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.27 
Malawi-
Mauritius 
0.80 0.38 0.81 0.91 0.69 0.22 0.15 0.65 1.87 1.80 1.83 3.04 4.35 2.65 5.86 6.80 14.12 14.50 
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Malawi-
Mozambique 
6.85 14.26 16.40 25.94 53.60 60.78 52.19 52.69 129.11 96.26 25.22 38.35 59.66 109.65 124.38 50.41 48.39 60.36 
Malawi-
Namibia 
0.07 1.07 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.22 0.38 3.12 21.64 19.77 1.30 3.40 1.57 1.39 1.26 1.60 
Malawi-
Seychelles 
0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.28 0.74 0.69 0.44 0.38 172.91 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.51 0.27 0.25 0.30 
Malawi-
South Africa 
132.85 131.06 153.27 165.91 168.75 200.61 227.55 230.31 313.94 155.69 305.67 298.46 292.67 322.40 280.13 231.24 229.8 260.98 
Malawi-
Eswatini 
3.72 0.81 3.22 1.41 1.39 1.34 2.73 1.28 2.49 3.03 5.01 4.60 4.81 2.89 4.28 5.56 4.26 4.22 
Malawi-
Tanzania 
6.77 4.85 6.42 5.62 13.12 13.02 17.90 29.74 52.76 32.17 25.82 46.76 43.68 31.99 35.89 32.53 30.61 41.85 
Malawi-
Zambia 
19.42 7.06 7.80 15.05 24.63 38.53 31.95 23.60 40.33 45.24 68.07 71.73 89.75 102.41 81.11 65.70 70.48 55.71 
Malawi-
Zimbabwe 
24.10 13.98 30.95 24.62 26.94 32.35 32.53 75.58 55.94 45.61 58.59 76.13 52.79 55.21 62.82 61.70 64.09 72.95 
Malawi-
Madagascar 
0.00 0.00 0.29 1.77 1.22 0.65 0.74 1.84 0.09 0.01 0.25 0.10 0.07 1.36 0.84 1.34 1.18 1.56 
Mauritius-
Mozambique 
0.87 0.68 2.35 2.02 7.17 5.77 2.40 2.40 3.93 10.06 5.58 12.53 10.95 17.12 18.31 14.48 12.72 14.02 
Mauritius-
Namibia 
0.22 0.16 0.30 0.44 0.41 0.23 0.13 0.91 1.04 1.09 0.88 2.04 1.67 1.64 1.62 1.87 2.11 3.09 
Mauritius-
Seychelles 
3.62 4.62 16.11 6.72 10.07 10.05 16.60 20.27 23.33 20.56 19.32 82.02 21.17 27.42 23.43 37.18 35.68 31.31 
Mauritius-
South Africa 
154.93 147.47 138.55 150.89 155.98 166.51 160.51 170.97 226.93 190.55 229.97 251.10 276.62 260.76 264.97 248.71 255.4 323.41 
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Mauritius-
Eswatini 
4.68 2.26 2.50 5.21 4.26 2.12 2.47 2.48 2.59 2.36 2.11 2.30 2.32 2.20 2.22 2.58 2.57 4.18 
Mauritius-
Tanzania 
1.77 2.57 1.54 1.38 3.92 2.60 1.64 1.65 2.08 1.87 3.98 3.92 9.31 8.80 6.89 12.48 10.27 3.63 
Mauritius-
Zambia 
1.22 2.35 4.77 3.19 4.00 3.11 3.92 5.52 10.21 12.11 9.18 27.06 24.09 21.23 42.36 122.94 89.73 55.91 
Mauritius-
Zimbabwe 
7.19 5.12 5.83 2.24 3.17 2.62 2.33 3.18 2.77 3.04 4.89 5.70 4.03 4.06 2.91 3.56 2.91 3.58 
Mauritius-
Madagascar 
35.09 50.09 36.79 63.67 51.54 47.41 46.89 58.21 62.30 53.75 71.09 74.20 67.10 68.38 86.68 82.50 91.04 90.65 
Mozambique-
Namibia 
1.09 0.41 0.32 1.99 6.53 10.30 9.67 8.26 9.57 7.51 8.18 16.76 23.76 33.99 27.65 50.07 22.47 20.69 
Mozambique-
Seychelles 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.65 0.22 0.50 
Mozambique-
South Africa 
331.52 305.83 285.66 400.34 462.56 591.98 593.66 760.02 851.81 960.91 1034.7 1552.8 1578.0 2087.0 1985.8 1540.8 1328 1611.21 
Mozambique-
Eswatini 
17.38 12.92 29.77 45.11 46.87 43.34 70.96 13.39 14.03 14.47 92.38 88.84 92.10 93.25 93.62 82.76 78.79 82.52 
Mozambique-
Tanzania 
0.79 0.72 0.56 1.39 2.98 3.96 10.71 12.32 15.32 11.28 25.61 31.24 21.81 57.86 35.77 19.28 9.82 8.61 
Mozambique-
Zambia 
2.58 1.26 0.79 2.72 1.38 3.89 5.33 15.90 18.32 12.97 6.26 16.94 22.33 16.77 31.62 33.62 64.35 52.86 
Mozambique-
Zimbabwe 
41.35 34.10 63.48 29.24 27.55 27.90 31.65 130.10 29.95 46.40 43.84 72.10 96.43 126.17 179.52 147.81 82.81 101.29 
Mozambique-
Madagascar 
0.02 0.06 0.05 0.24 0.19 0.07 0.49 0.92 0.88 0.52 1.86 1.38 0.86 1.68 1.30 2.10 2.51 3.24 
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Namibia-
Seychelles 
0.00 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.11 1.36 0.33 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.34 0.45 0.16 
Namibia-
South Africa 
389.33 427.88 332.57 386.13 675.28 717.14 783.73 1078.8 1171.2 1580.5 2658.4 2919.4 2669.4 2832.6 2674.3 2625.8 2153 2326.48 
Namibia-
Eswatini 
0.49 0.52 0.10 1.92 2.77 3.20 5.40 10.80 11.46 12.16 31.92 30.08 36.03 36.34 44.24 30.14 28.21 30.74 
Namibia-
Tanzania 
0.18 0.13 0.28 0.37 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.61 0.83 1.61 0.97 0.83 58.48 31.26 10.78 2.67 2.37 1.80 
Namibia-
Zambia 
1.45 1.00 1.05 1.32 5.14 8.52 8.73 17.31 16.30 29.66 35.13 58.27 91.70 120.19 74.96 122.39 175.0 161.47 
Namibia-
Zimbabwe 
0.04 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.23 0.30 0.99 4.49 0.66 1.74 2.48 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.14 3.55 0.11 0.65 
Namibia-
Madagascar 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 
Seychelles-
South Africa 
7.75 6.43 5.98 9.70 9.39 9.65 7.82 10.13 11.88 5.47 6.12 5.96 14.02 15.91 12.87 10.99 8.00 9.38 
Seychelles-
Eswatini 
19.22 11.46 20.08 21.84 21.38 36.02 32.87 29.23 31.16 34.21 31.61 31.52 27.02 23.49 28.53 32.82 43.57 39.65 
Seychelles-
Tanzania 
0.26 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.27 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.08 
Seychelles-
Zambia 
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.20 1.80 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.32 0.35 0.24 0.06 
Seychelles-
Zimbabwe 
0.17 0.05 0.08 0.02 1.89 0.72 0.41 0.50 0.67 0.62 0.86 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.78 0.86 
Seychelles-
Madagascar 
0.73 1.88 3.02 0.63 0.70 0.70 2.35 2.29 6.46 3.23 7.35 8.01 4.57 3.89 6.50 3.68 6.42 6.59 
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South Africa-
Eswatini 
388.20 292.30 263.43 430.21 618.87 454.53 360.34 480.45 480.45 480.45 1843.6 1751.5 1822.8 1836.8 1821.8 1668.3 1606 1751.89 
South Africa-
Tanzania 
97.92 96.73 101.53 145.25 207.42 288.97 323.06 309.33 417.97 338.11 457.6 625.9 645.4 528.9 460.0 440.3 393 362.19 
South Africa-
Zambia 
371.66 343.63 344.45 391.26 567.45 620.85 818.85 1054.9 1236.7 887.1 1133.9 1551.0 1722.6 1816.7 1710.4 1420.7 1276 1368.04 
South Africa-
Zimbabwe 
459.84 422.11 546.38 562.16 755.59 639.87 772.87 1141.2 1335.6 1178.5 1566.0 1933.6 1993.9 1957.9 1722.0 1585.9 1685 1315.21 
South Africa-
Madagascar 
19.64 31.49 21.22 52.75 48.43 44.82 46.19 79.31 125.42 77.01 106.40 105.27 109.86 125.42 135.24 125.84 126 141.77 
Eswatini-
Tanzania 
10.05 3.18 4.01 3.09 5.09 6.11 4.66 5.16 19.29 12.03 8.52 15.63 9.35 10.40 12.08 11.57 10.33 6.19 
Eswatini-
Zambia 
3.35 2.52 3.67 2.43 1.48 5.34 1.89 4.16 4.54 3.52 7.17 5.51 8.81 7.84 13.65 9.72 6.76 14.76 
Eswatini-
Zimbabwe 
11.66 3.92 10.28 30.17 2.17 4.49 96.40 4.38 3.99 6.00 26.09 24.76 20.03 19.88 19.89 17.60 16.23 17.57 
Eswatini-
Madagascar 
0.66 1.87 0.33 1.55 35.67 3.31 4.20 5.71 4.42 2.14 0.58 1.31 1.86 1.35 2.01 2.65 2.70 3.42 
Tanzania-
Zambia 
16.99 4.74 21.00 43.74 43.33 26.81 27.55 42.13 41.93 34.59 40.94 57.99 73.25 72.03 85.01 45.53 80.29 96.78 
Tanzania-
Zimbabwe 
4.23 1.40 2.80 2.97 2.23 3.10 1.62 9.24 2.06 2.71 2.39 5.16 3.62 4.09 4.65 4.57 3.41 3.55 
Tanzania-
Madagascar 
0.03 0.85 0.45 1.23 1.37 0.86 0.68 0.72 1.83 1.67 4.87 6.89 4.37 1.04 3.00 3.00 2.62 5.52 
Zambia-
Zimbabwe 
47.22 34.57 60.15 70.95 88.36 269.78 265.00 304.72 327.16 300.81 323.77 366.89 413.09 404.60 356.27 387.65 357.8 309.11 
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Zambia-
Madagascar 
0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.96 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.13 
Zimbabwe-
Madagascar 
0.03 0.04 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.26 0.47 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.37 0.53 0.50 0.93 
 
Source: “Direction of Trade Statistics” IMF (2018)
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Appendix Table 11. Data Summary Statistics 
 
 
 Country Pair 
Average 
Bilateral Trade 
US$ Millions 
(2000-2017) 
Product of 
Country-Pair 
Land Mass 
Area (Km2) 
Distance 
Between 
Country-pair 
(Km) 
Common 
Language Landlocked 
 
Common 
Currency 
Pairs 
Common 
Land 
Border 
Angola-Botswana 0.7092 725.2428 2224.045476 0 1 0 0 
Angola-DRC 2.0581 2923.3345 549.6035669 1 0 0 1 
Angola-Lesotho 0.0188 37.8436 2720.95923 0 1 0 0 
Angola-Malawi 0.0203 147.7140 2304.882078 0 1 0 0 
Angola-Mauritius 3.5069 2.5433 4910.441551 0 0 0 0 
Angola-Mozambique 2.7505 996.5870 2793.702122 1 0 0 0 
Angola-Namibia 118.0965 1027.6448 1584.372958 0 0 0 1 
Angola-Seychelles 0.0697 0.5672 4679.278234 0 0 0 0 
Angola-South Africa 961.8556 1519.8395 2456.274808 0 0 0 0 
Angola-Eswatini 3.3553 21.6477 2706.585994 0 1 0 0 
Angola-Tanzania 1.6507 1180.9989 2875.875118 0 0 0 0 
Angola-Zambia 1.3192 938.2889 1791.712323 1 1 0 1 
Angola-Zimbabwe 0.6941 487.1568 2213.101891 0 1 0 0 
Angola-Madagascar 0.2030 658.6254 3771.6 0 0 0 0 
Botswana-DRC 2.9210 1364.0742 2539.898564 0 1 0 0 
Botswana-Lesotho 1.0282 17.6584 530.5906361 0 1 0 0 
Botswana-Malawi 3.3630 68.9257 1449.140297 1 1 0 0 
Botswana-Mauritius 1.5348 1.1867 3275.734194 1 1 0 0 
Botswana-Mozambique 6.3190 465.0233 682.8486839 0 1 0 0 
Botswana-Namibia 189.5869 479.5154 929.3654314 1 1 0 1 
Botswana-Seychelles 0.0705 0.2647 3864.35638 1 1 0 0 
Botswana-South Africa 1558.0790 709.1812 251.9522154 1 1 0 1 
Botswana-Eswatini 3.7318 10.1012 547.4935141 1 1 1 0 
Botswana-Tanzania 1.2812 551.0728 2449.497625 1 1 0 0 
Botswana-Zambia 21.1415 437.8205 1066.036228 1 1 0 1 
Botswana-Zimbabwe 83.3327 227.3151 961.3829253 1 1 1 1 
Botswana-Madagascar 0.0626 307.3251 2316.9 0 0 0 0 
DRC-Lesotho 0.0009 71.1782 3061.432758 0 1 0 0 
DRC-Malawi 0.9828 277.8282 2288.825336 0 1 0 0 
DRC-Mauritius 0.0084 4.7835 4889.825336 1 0 0 0 
DRC-Mozambique 0.2311 1874.4326 3030.10326 0 0 0 0 
DRC-Namibia 42.3187 1932.8477 2039.012696 0 0 0 0 
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DRC-Seychelles 0.0002 1.0669 4447.485183 1 0 0 0 
DRC-South Africa 367.1052 2858.5929 2749.583946 0 0 0 0 
DRC-Eswatini 0.0052 40.7161 2966.383176 0 1 0 0 
DRC-Tanzania 63.5023 2221.2840 2666.642914 1 0 0 1 
DRC-Zambia 506.4804 1764.7823 1881.260075 0 1 0 1 
DRC-Zimbabwe 36.2776 916.2697 2316.379198 0 1 0 0 
DRC-Madagascar 0.1867 1238.7768 4266.4 1 0 0 0 
Lesotho-Malawi 0.2103 3.5966 1820.994144 1 1 0 0 
Lesotho-Mauritius 0.6160 0.0619 3184.425281 1 1 0 0 
Lesotho-Mozambique 0.4764 24.2652 624.8520236 0 1 0 0 
Lesotho-Namibia 0.2520 25.0214 1279.211116 1 1 1 0 
Lesotho-Seychelles 0.0003 0.0138 4020.613878 1 1 0 0 
Lesotho-South Africa 507.6318 37.0055 402.0035129 1 1 1 1 
Lesotho-Eswatini 4.1876 0.5271 488.5330085 1 1 1 0 
Lesotho-Tanzania 0.0651 28.7553 2790.568945 1 1 0 0 
Lesotho-Zambia 1.7991 22.8457 1546.737972 1 1 0 0 
Lesotho-Zimbabwe 1.2340 11.8614 1339.664566 1 1 1 0 
Lesotho-Madagascar 0.6268 16.0364 2333.7 0 1 0 0 
Malawi-Mauritius 3.4140 0.2417 2613.319468 1 1 0 0 
Malawi-Mozambique 56.9170 94.7137 1336.965643 1 1 0 1 
Malawi-Namibia 3.1830 97.6654 2613.319468 1 1 0 0 
Malawi-Seychelles 9.8465 0.0539 1336.965643 1 1 0 0 
Malawi-South Africa 227.8473 144.4427 1995.035665 1 1 0 0 
Malawi-Eswatini 3.1703 2.0574 1395.780755 1 1 0 0 
Malawi-Tanzania 26.1951 112.2399 1002.280515 1 1 0 1 
Malawi-Zambia 47.6985 89.1732 607.0164224 1 1 0 1 
Malawi-Zimbabwe 48.1603 46.2985 489.8532261 1 1 0 0 
Malawi-Madagascar 0.7399 62.5945 1563.2 0 1 0 0 
Mauritius-Mozambique 7.9637 1.6307 2662.971171 0 0 0 0 
Mauritius-Namibia 1.1030 1.6816 4176.760575 1 0 0 0 
Mauritius-Seychelles 22.7484 0.0009 1740.243412 1 0 0 0 
Mauritius-South Africa 209.6790 2.4869 3057.988552 1 0 0 0 
Mauritius-Eswatini 2.8570 0.0354 2774.881728 1 1 0 0 
Mauritius-Tanzania 4.4614 1.9325 2461.387694 1 0 0 0 
Mauritius-Zambia 24.6063 1.5353 3131.717112 1 1 0 0 
Mauritius-Zimbabwe 3.8400 0.7971 2741.218735 1 1 0 0 
Mauritius-Madagascar 63.1867 1.0777 1056.5 1 0 0 0 
Mozambique-Namibia 14.4022 658.9225 1612.199462 0 0 0 0 
Mozambique-Seychelles 0.0997 0.3637 3396.344907 0 0 0 0 
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Mozambique-South Africa 1014.5769 974.5162 442.2752819 0 0 0 1 
Mozambique-Eswatini 56.2507 13.8804 152.5420267 0 1 0 1 
Mozambique-Tanzania 15.0016 757.2527 2245.033554 0 0 0 1 
Mozambique-Zambia 17.2164 601.6278 1254.316586 0 1 0 1 
Mozambique-Zimbabwe 72.8712 312.3633 910.6344994 1 1 0 1 
Mozambique-Madagascar 1.0194 422.3085 1720.9 0 0 0 0 
Namibia-Seychelles 0.1757 0.3751 4574.20691 1 0 0 0 
Namibia-South Africa 1577.8944 1004.8861 1175.963976 1 0 1 1 
Namibia-Eswatini 17.5846 14.3130 1474.890848 1 1 1 0 
Namibia-Tanzania 6.3542 780.8518 2950.801676 1 0 0 0 
Namibia-Zambia 51.6427 620.3770 1471.420635 1 1 0 1 
Namibia-Zimbabwe 0.8956 322.0979 1590.139268 1 1 1 0 
Namibia-Madagascar 0.0264 435.4693 3185.1 0 0 0 0 
Seychelles-South Africa 9.3026 0.5547 3733.023771 1 0 0 0 
Seychelles-Eswatini 28.6490 0.0079 3534.009465 1 1 0 0 
Seychelles-Tanzania 0.1247 0.4310 1803.479147 1 0 0 0 
Seychelles-Zambia 0.2003 0.3424 3199.804345 1 1 0 0 
Seychelles-Zimbabwe 0.6865 0.1778 2987.913882 1 1 0 0 
Seychelles-Madagascar 3.8321 0.2404 1808.3 1 0 0 0 
South Africa-Eswatini 1019.5752 21.1683 299.201643 1 1 1 1 
South Africa-Tanzania 346.6655 1154.8440 2143.223236 1 0 0 0 
South Africa-Zambia 1035.3169 917.5091 1148.303885 1 1 0 0 
South Africa-Zimbabwe 1198.5322 476.3680 944.3926431 1 1 1 1 
South Africa-Madagascar 84.5346 644.0392 2121.6 0 0 0 0 
Eswatini-Tanzania 8.7076 16.4489 2333.573925 1 1 0 0 
Eswatini-Zambia 5.9506 13.0685 1244.070801 1 1 0 0 
Eswatini-Zimbabwe 18.6386 6.7851 914.7148783 1 1 1 0 
Eswatini-Madagascar 4.2072 9.1733 1869.9 0 1 0 0 
Tanzania-Zambia 47.4789 712.9550 1533.684821 1 1 0 1 
Tanzania-Zimbabwe 3.5444 370.1641 1488.13524 1 1 0 0 
Tanzania-Madagascar 2.2776 500.4539 1615.1 0 0 0 0 
Zambia-Zimbabwe 260.4412 294.0908 435.191425 1 1 0 1 
Zambia-Madagascar 0.1517 397.6043 2078.9 0 1 0 0 
Zimbabwe-Madagascar 0.2592 206.4350 1741.2 0 1 0 0 
Note: Product of mass land area is divided by a factor of 1 000 000 
 
 
 
